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Deanne Sowter*

The Future Harm Exception: Coercive Control
as Serious Psychological Harm and the
Challenge for Lawyers’ Ethics

Can a lawyer use the future harm exception to prevent her client from coercively
controlling his former spouse? Lawyers are required to keep their clients’ secrets
unless an exception applies. One of those exceptions is where there is a clear and
imminent risk of serious bodily harm or death to an identifiable group or person.
The exception provides that serious psychological harm constitutes serious bodily
harm, but there is very little guidance as to what type of threat might meet the
test. Coercive control is a type of family violence whereby an abusive spouse
will use a pattern of tactics designed to control his partner. In this paper, I argue
that the psychological harm caused by coercive control meets the test for the
future harm exception. An abuser’s lawyer can use the exception to try to prevent
psychological harm to her client’s former spouse. However, this idea creates
tension with the lawyer’s duty of loyalty, and the test itself is challenging in the
context of coercive control. As a result, when a lawyer who is representing an
abusive client has a reasonable hunch that her client is behaving badly, she has
very few options. I provide three recommendations for amendments to the Model
Code of Professional Conduct to be responsive to coercive control; but to be truly
responsive, real change needs to be made to the justice system and the lawyer’s
role itself.
Une avocate peut-elle utiliser l’exception du préjudice futur pour empêcher sa
cliente de contrôler son ex-conjoint de manière coercitive? Les avocats sont tenus
à la confidentialité en ce qui a trait aux secrets de leurs clients, à moins qu’une
exception ne s’applique. L’une de ces exceptions est le cas où il existe un risque
clair et imminent de préjudice corporel grave ou de mort pour un groupe ou une
personne identifiable. L’exception prévoit qu’une atteinte psychologique grave
constitue aussi une atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique, mais il existe très peu
d’indications sur le type de menace qui pourrait répondre à ce critère. Le contrôle
coercitif est un type de violence familiale par lequel un conjoint violent utilise un
ensemble de tactiques destinées à contrôler son partenaire. Dans cet article, je
soutiens que le préjudice psychologique causé par le contrôle coercitif répond au
critère de l’exception pour préjudice futur. L’avocat d’un agresseur peut utiliser
l’exception pour tenter d’empêcher que l’ex-conjoint de son client ne subisse un
préjudice psychologique. Cependant, cette idée crée une tension avec le devoir
de loyauté de l’avocat, et le test lui-même est difficile à préciser dans le contexte
du contrôle coercitif. Par conséquent, lorsqu’une avocate qui représente un client
violent a une intuition raisonnable que son client se comporte mal, elle a très peu
d’options. Je propose trois recommandations de modifications au Modèle de code
de déontologie pour qu’il soit adapté au contrôle coercitif ; mais pour qu’il le soit
vraiment, il faut apporter de véritables changements au système de justice et au
rôle de l’avocat lui-même.
*
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Introduction
Can a lawyer use the future harm exception to prevent her client from
coercively controlling his former spouse?1 A lawyer has a near “absolute”
duty to keep her client’s confidences.2 She can only disclose protected
information in the most extraordinary circumstances, pursuant to a limited
range of exceptions. There is no exception to solicitor-client privilege and
the duty of confidentiality designed specifically for coercive control, or
family violence generally.3 The one exception that might be helpful is the
future harm exception, which provides that a lawyer may disclose protected
1.
The use of gendered pronouns is not meant to hide violence in lesbian and gay relationships,
or to exclude non-binary persons. I use gendered pronouns throughout this paper because coercive
control is primarily a gendered form of intimate partner violence, perpetuated by men against women.
See generally: Pamela Cross, et. al., Department of Justice, “What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You:
The importance of family violence screening tools for family law practitioners” (2018) at 9-10,
online (pdf): Department of Justice <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/can-peut/can-peut.pdf> [perma.
cc/3JDM-H8C2] [Luke’s Place Report].
2.
R v McClure, 2001 SCC 14 at para 35 [McClure].
3.
The term family violence is an umbrella term which includes domestic violence, intimate partner
violence, coercive control, and abuse by family members against each other.
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information where there is a clear and imminent risk of serious bodily
harm or death to an identifiable group or person.4 In such a case, limited
disclosure of protected information may5 be made for the singular purpose
of trying to prevent harm. The exception provides that serious psychological
harm constitutes serious bodily harm, but there is very little guidance as
to what type of threat might meet the test. Although the exception was
clearly not designed to accommodate cumulative psychological harm, the
type caused by coercive control, the exception is all we have and so this
paper explores its possible usefulness and ultimately points to a need for
broader systemic change to properly respond to coercive control.
Coercive control is a gendered form of family violence6 that is
“overwhelmingly perpetrated by men against women.”7 Dr. Evan Stark
defined the behaviour as an “ongoing pattern of domination by which
male abusive partners primarily interweave repeated physical and
sexual violence with intimidation, sexual degradation, isolation and
control.”8 There are competing definitions of coercive control that often
turn on whether physical violence is necessary, but the commonality is
a pattern of coercion and control tactics.9 Stark’s conception does not
4.
See Smith v Jones, [1999] 1 SCR 455 (SCC), 169 DLR (4th) 385 [Smith]; Federation of Law
Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct, Ottawa: Federation of Law Societies of
Canada, 2019, R 3.3-3 [Model Code].
5.
The exception to solicitor-client privilege and confidentiality is discretionary (meaning a lawyer
has no obligation to disclose what she knows), except in New Brunswick, Manitoba and Saskatchewan
where the exception to confidentiality is mandatory. (This is discussed further below.) See Model
Code, ibid at R 3.3-3; Law Society of Saskatchewan, Code of Professional Conduct, Regina, SK:
Law Society Saskatchewan, 2016, R 3.3-3A [LSS]; Law Society of Manitoba, Code of Professional
Conduct, Winnipeg, MB: Law Society of Manitoba, 2011, R 3.3-3A [LSM]; Law Society of New
Brunswick, Code of Professional Conduct, Fredericton, NB: Law Society New Brunswick, 2018, R
3.3-3A (except where there is financial harm, see R 3.3-3B) [LSNB].
However, the discretionary nature of Smith v Jones is a point of contention with the decision,
see: Wayne N Renke, “Secrets and Lives—The Public Safety Exception to Solicitor Client Privilege:
Smith v Jones” (1999) 37:4 Alta L Rev 1045 at 1059-1061; Adam Dodek, “Doing our Duty: The Case
for a Duty of Disclosure to Prevent Death or Serious Harm” (2001) 50 UNBLJ 215 at 216-219 [Dodek,
Duty]; Alice Woolley, Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics in Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto: LexisNexis,
2016) at 216 [Woolley, ULEC]; David M Tanovich, “Law’s Ambition and the Reconstruction of Role
Morality in Canada” (2005) 28 Dal LJ 267 at 297.
6.
See generally Kristin L Anderson, “Gendering Coercive Control” (2009) 15:2 Violence Against
Women 1444.
7.
Luke’s Place Report, supra note 1 at 9.
8.
Evan Stark, “Re-presenting Battered Women: Coercive Control and the Defense of Liberty”
(Paper prepared for Violence Against Women: Complex Realities and New Issues in a Changing
World Conference, Montreal, 2012) at 7, online (pdf): Stop Violence Against Women <www.stopvaw.
org/uploads/evan_stark_article_final_100812.pdf> [perma.cc/J2XU-LKZ3] [Stark, Re-presenting].
See also: R v Craig, 2011 ONCA 142 at para 26 [Craig]; Evan Stark, Coercive Control: How Men
Entrap Women in Personal Life (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007) [Stark, CC].
9.
See Evan Stark & Marianne Hester, “Coercive Control: Update and Review” (2019) 25:1
Violence Against Women 81 at 89 [Stark & Hester]; Michael P Johnson, Typology of Domestic
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demand violence,10 he defines coercion tactics as “the use of force or
threats to compel or dispel a particular response” and control tactics as
including “deprivation, exploitation, and command that compel obedience
indirectly.”11 The effect is “a condition of entrapment that can be hostagelike in the harms it inflicts on dignity, liberty, autonomy and personhood
as well as to physical and psychological integrity.”12 Coercive control
can cause “serious physical injuries, death, and long-term psychological
harm.”13 The survivor may suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD)14 or what is known as complex-PTSD, which is associated with
never ending trauma, the kind typically seen in political kidnappings.15
While it may seem obvious that a lawyer should try to prevent any
kind of harm, it is not part of her role. Her role, properly understood, is
to pursue her client’s interests within the bounds of legality.16 A lawyer
provides access to the law and facilitates her client’s ability to make
decisions.17 She can only do what the client instructs and the law allows.18
Lawyers are famous for keeping secrets that if disclosed would have
prevented harm, but because of their role and the duty to maintain client
confidences, they kept the secret. That said, those examples are often
obscure and not replicated in daily practice—a bomb in a central train

Violence: Intimate Terrorism, Violent Resistance, and Situational Couple Violence (Lebanon, NH:
Northeastern University Press, 2008) at 1-28 [Johnson]; Dr. Jane Wangmann, “Different Types of
Intimate Partner Violence—An Exploration of the Literature” (2011) 22 Australian Domestic &
Family Violence Clearinghouse 1 [Wangmann].
10. See Stark & Hester, ibid at 89.
11. Stark, CC, supra note 8 at 228-229. See also: Stark & Hester, ibid at 89.
12. Stark, Re-presenting, supra note 8 at 7.
13. Luke’s Place Report, supra note 1 at 9.
14. See Craig, supra note 8 at paras 24-31.
15. See Elizabeth Sheehy, Defending Battered Women on Trial: Lessons from Transcripts (Vancouver,
BC: UBC Press, 2014) at 2-3; Charlotte Bishop & Vanessa Bettinson, “Evidencing domestic violence,
including behaviour that falls under the new offence of ‘controlling or coercive behaviour’” (2018)
22(1) Intl J Evidence & Proof 3 at 11-12 [Bishop & Bettinson, Evidence].
16. See generally Gerald Postema, “Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics” (1980) 55 NYULR
63 at 73; Alice Woolley, “Is Positivist Legal Ethics an Oxymoron?” (2019) 32 Geo J Leg Ethics 77
at 88 [Woolley, Positivist]; Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Fidelity to Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2010) at 176 [Wendel, Fidelity].
17. See Woolley, ULEC, supra note 5 at 56.
18. See Wendel, Fidelity, supra note 16 at 49-50; Postema, supra note 17 at 73-74; Woolley,
Positivist, supra note 16 at 88.
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station,19 the existence of a brain aneurysm,20 or the location of a dead
body.21
In contrast, every family lawyer will represent a victim or perpetrator of
family violence at least once in their career. I would guess that most family
lawyers have at least one client who has experienced or inflicted family
violence. Moreover, under the newly amended Divorce Act,22 coercive
control is now relevant under the best interests of the child doctrine;23 and
family lawyers need to consider whether a settlement-oriented process24
is “appropriate”25 and advise accordingly.26 In other words, all family
lawyers need to understand coercive control.27
In this paper, I argue that the future harm exception to solicitorclient privilege and confidentiality can be used to try to prevent serious
19. See Monroe Freedman, “The Life-Saving Exception to Confidentiality: Restating Law Without
the Was, the Will Be, or the Ought To Be” (1996) 29:4 Loy LA L Rev 1631 at 1632 [Freedman,
Confidentiality].
20. See Spaulding v Zimmerman, 116 NW 2d (Minn 1962) (US); David Luban, “Partisanship:
Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann” (1990) 90:4
Colum L Rev 1004 at 1026; Freedman, Confidentiality, ibid; Woolley, Positivist, supra note 16 at 94;
Wendel, Fidelity, supra note 16 at 72-76 and 138-139.
21. See People v Belge, 83 Misc 2d 186, 372 NYS 2d 798 (Onondaga County Ct 1975) aff’d, 50 AD
2d 1088, NYS 2d 711 (1975), aff’d 41 NY 2d 60, 359 NE 2d 371, 390 NYS 2d 867 (1976); Wendel,
Fidelity, ibid at 30; David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An ethical study (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1988) at 53-54.
22. See also Family Law Act, SBC 2011 c25 at ss 1, 8, 37-38 [BC FLA]; Bill 207, An Act to amend
the Children’s Law Reform Act, the Courts of Justice Act, the Family Law Act and other Acts respecting
various family law matters, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, Ontario, 2020 s 18(2) at 24 (Third Reading Debate 5
November 2020).
23. See Bill C-78, An Act to Amend the Divorce Act, the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement
Assistance Act and the Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act and to make consequential
amendments to another Act, 1st Sess 42nd Parl 2019, ss 1(7), 16(3) and 16(4) (Royal Assent 21 June
2019); Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp).
24. See Model Code, supra note 5 at R 3.2-4.
25. Bill C-78, supra note 23 at ss 1(7) and 7.7(2). See also Divorce Act, supra note 23 at s 9(2);
BC FLA, supra note 22 at s 8 (The BC FLA is more explicit, requiring family lawyers to “assess”
whether coercive control is present, and if so, the “extent to which” it may affect the “safety” and
“ability” of the parties to “negotiate a fair agreement”). Assessment must be done in accordance with
the regulations, but there are currently none for lawyers, see: BC Reg 84/2019.
26. Cf Department of Justice, “Legislative Background: An Act to amend the Divorce Act, the
Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act and the Garnishment, Attachment
and Pension Diversion Act and to make consequential amendments to another Act (Bill C-78 in
the 42nd Parliament)” (29 August 2019) at B, online (pdf): Department of Justice <justice.gc.ca>
[perma.cc/2GJT-9MC9] [Legislative Background]; Senate Standing Senate Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs, “Observations to the thirty-fourth report of the Standing Senate Committee on
Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Bill C-78)” at 4, online (pdf): SenCanada <sencanada.ca> [perma.cc/
E4JK-UGK8] [Senate Committee]; Linda C Neilson & Susan B Boyd, “Interpreting the new Divorce
Act, Rules of Statutory Interpretation & Senate Observations” (8 March 2020) at 12-13 [unpublished].
27. Cf Model Code, supra note 4 at R 3.1. See also Deanne Sowter, “Lawyer (In)competence
and Family Violence” (20 March 2019), online (blog): Ablawg <ablawg.ca/2019/03/20/lawyerincompetence-and-family-violence> [perma.cc/AGZ7-E67B] [Sowter, (In)competence].
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psychological harm.28 When the test is met, a lawyer can use the exception
to disclose protected information to whomever she reasonably believes can
prevent the harm. The challenge is that coercive control may not be clear,
and even if it is, the decision about whether to disclose will be difficult
because of competing obligations. In part one, I describe a lawyer’s duty to
maintain her client’s confidences and the future harm exception. Part two
provides a detailed examination of coercive control. In part three, I argue
that the psychological harm caused by coercive control can constitute
serious psychological harm for the purpose of the future harm exception. A
challenge with coercive control is that there is no one identifiable pattern,
but rather a broad range of possible combinations which will be specific
to the parties. In that sense, the fact that the exception was designed to
prevent a would-be serial killer becomes challenging to transfer to coercive
control, where there is not necessarily one seriously harmful attack but
an ongoing pattern of abuse. In the final part, I raise concerns about the
lack of guidance for lawyers who are worried about victim safety but do
not have enough information to meet the test—the hard cases. Finally, I
provide three ways that the Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model
Code of Professional Conduct29 can be clarified to respond to coercive
control.
I. The lawyer’s ethical obligations
The role of a lawyer is to pursue her client’s interests within the bounds of
legality.30 The duty of loyalty is grounded in the law governing fiduciaries
and is the heart of the solicitor-client relationship.31 A lawyer has an
almost unwavering duty to her client’s cause, matched only by her duty to
the administration of justice. If she were to have an obligation to a third
person, that may risk her ability to be loyal to her client and may amount
to a conflict of interest.32 The duty of loyalty supports the duty to preserve
client confidences. A lawyer must keep her client’s secrets and only

28. See Smith, supra note 4; Model Code, ibid at R 3.3-3.
29. See Model Code, ibid.
30. See Postema, supra note 16 at 73; Woolley, Positivist, supra note 16 at 88; Wendel, Fidelity,
supra note 16 at 176.
31. The following duties spring from the duty of loyalty: avoid conflicting interests, commitment
to the client’s cause, candour, and keeping a client’s confidence, see Model Code, supra note 4 at Rs
3.2-2, 3.3, and 3.4-1[5-9]; Canadian National Railway Co v McKercher LLP, 2013 SCC 39 at paras
19-26 [McKercher]; R v Neil, 2002 SCC 70 at para 16.
32. See Model Code, ibid at R 3.4.
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disclose protected information in the most extraordinary circumstances
pursuant to an exception,33 client consent or waiver.34
The need for a client to be able to make “full and frank” disclosure
to his lawyer so the lawyer can competently represent her client, is cited
as the purpose of a lawyer’s obligation to keep her client’s confidences.35
The argument often given is that a client will not disclose all the relevant
facts to his lawyer unless he is “secure in the knowledge that the words
and documents which fall within the scope of the privilege will not be
disclosed.”36
If a lawyer discloses protected information absent a court order and she
is wrong about whether an exception applies, or if she discloses because
she thinks it is in the public interest despite no exception permitting the
disclosure, she may be held liable. Her client may sue her for damages,37
citing breach of confidentiality38 and breach of fiduciary duty.39 She may
33. Exceptions include the following: the innocence at stake exception to solicitor-client privilege;
the future harm exception; some statutory overrides, such as in the context of child protection
legislation (some provinces only require reporting if the information is confidential—e.g.: Ontario,
British Columbia, Alberta and Nova Scotia – whereas Newfoundland requires reporting regardless if
the information is both confidential and protected by solicitor client privilege); and, in the lawyer’s
self-defence or to collect legal fees. See generally R v Brown, 2002 SCC 32; Smith, supra note 4;
McClure, supra note 2; Model Code, ibid at R 3.3-1(c), R 3.3-3, R 3.3-4, R 3.3-5, R 3.3-6, and R 3.37; Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, SO 2017 c 14 s 1, s 125(10-11); Child, Family and
Community Services Act, RBC 1996 c 46, s 14(1-2); Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, RSA
2000 c C-12, s 4(2-3); Children and Family Services Act, RSNS 1990 c 5 at s 25A; Children, Youth
and Families Act, SNL 2018 c C-12.3, s 11.
34. See Model Code, ibid at R 3.3-1(a-b). See generally Adam Dodek, Solicitor-Client Privilege
(Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2014) at 189-256 [Dodek, SCP].
35. Solosky v The Queen, [1980] 1 SCR 821, 105 DLR (3d) 745 at 834 [Solosky]. See also Blank
v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2006 SCC 39 at para 26; McClure, supra note 2 at para 33; Canada
(Privacy Commissioner) v Blood Tribe Department of Health, 2008 SCC 44 at para 9 [Blood Tribe];
Model Code, ibid at Rs 3.3-1[1] and 3.3-3[1]; Dodek, Duty, supra note 5 at 220-221; Adam Dodek,
“Reconceiving Solicitor-Client Privilege” (2010) 35 Queen’s LJ 493 at 508-511; Dodek, SCP, ibid at
7-8. But see William H Simon, “Attorney-Client Confidentiality: A Critical Analysis” (2017) 30 Geo
J Leg Ethics 447 at 449 (trust does not rationalize confidentiality, lawyers can breach it in self-interest
re. claiming fees and in self-defense).
We cannot be certain that a client would not be truthful if there were no duty, see: Fred C
Zacharias, “Rethinking Confidentiality” (1989) 74 Iowa L Rev 351 at 364-366; Monroe H Freedman
& Abbe Smith, Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics, Fifth Edition (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic
Press, 2016) at 138-140; Renke, supra note 5 at 1053.
36. Smith, supra note 4 at para 35. But see Luke’s Place Report, supra note 1 at 15 (In the context
of family violence clients may not disclose everything because of shame, denial, fear or because they
think it is irrelevant.).
37. See Descôteaux et al v Mierzwinski, [1982] 1 SCR 860 (SCC) at 871 [Descôteaux].
38. Legal action for breach of confidentiality tends to occur when a client seeks to disqualify a
lawyer where there is potential for misuse of confidential information. This occurs more often than
a client suing a lawyer for actual misuse of confidential information causing harm. See generally:
Woolley, ULEC, supra note 5 at 195-198; Brooke MacKenzie, “Explaining Disqualification: an
empirical review of motions for the removal of counsel” (2020) 45:2 Queen’s L J 199.
39. See i.e. Szarfer v Chodos, [1986] 54 OR (2d) 663 (ON HCJ), aff’d [1988] 66 OR (2d) 350 (ON
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also be subject to disciplinary action by her law society for professional
misconduct.40 It is uncommon for lawyers to be disciplined for violating
privilege and confidentiality by trying to prevent harm from occurring;41
but that is not necessarily because privilege-holders are unwilling to seek
damages and law societies are unwilling to prosecute. It’s more likely that
it is just uncommon for lawyers to breach their professional obligations by
disclosing protected information.42 Lawyers typically take the obligation
seriously.
There are two distinct sources of the lawyer’s obligation to keep a
client’s confidences: the common law doctrine of solicitor-client privilege,
and the ethical duty of confidentiality found in law societies’ codes of
professional conduct.43 They both provide a benefit to the client by
protecting information from disclosure indefinitely, absent an exception.44
That said, not all communications are protected. A lawyer cannot assist her
client with illegal activity.45 The crime/fraud exclusion works to exclude
communications that are the material element of a crime (a.k.a. criminal
communications),46 and information exchanged when a client is seeking
legal advice for the purpose of committing a crime or fraud because those
communications “do not form part of the legal professional relationship and
hence no privilege can apply.”47 Excluding these communications protects

CA). See generally Alice Woolley, “Lawyer as Fiduciary: Defining Private Law Duties in Public Law
Relations” (2015) 65:2 UTLJ 285.
40. See i.e. Law Society of Alberta v Clark, [1998] LSDD No. 152 (LSDD); Law Society of Upper
Canada v A Member, 2005 CanLii 16408 (ON LST); Law Society of Upper Canada v Anber, [2014]
LSDD No. 169 (LSDD); Re. Mccarthy, 2016 LSBC 23.
41. I found two cases: LSBC v MacAdam, [1997] LSDD no. 55 (LSDD); Law Society of Alberta v
Burgener, 2016 ABLS 29. See also: Woolley, ULEC, supra note 5 at 195-197 (FNs 117-128).
42. But see Nicholas Bala, Rachel Birnbaum & Lorne Bertrand, “Controversy about the Role of
Children’s Lawyers: Advocate or Best Interests Guardian Comparing Practices in Two Canadian
Jurisdictions with Different Policies for Lawyers” (2013) 51:4 Fam Ct Rev 681 at 692 (20 per cent of
children’s lawyers in Ontario and Alberta have divulged a child’s “secret” to prevent harm).
43. See Model Code, supra note 4 at R 3.3-1.
44. See Blood Tribe, supra note 35 at para 9; R v Campbell, [1999] 1 SCR 565, 171 DLR (4th) 193
at para 49 [Campbell]; Model Code, ibid at R 3.3-1[3].
45. See Model Code, ibid at Rs 3.2-7, 3.2-8 and 5.1-2(e); Dodek, SCP, supra note 34 at 54.
46. See i.e. R v Malone, 1999 BCCA 446 at paras 3 and 14.
47. Dodek, SCP, supra note 34 at 54.
The crime fraud exclusion does not exclude a confession about a past crime, communications
about whether something is illegal, or the intention to commit a future crime. The exclusion only
excludes communications that are criminal in themselves. See Solosky, supra note 35; Descôteaux,
supra note 37 at 893; Campbell, supra note 44 at paras 55-64; Smith, supra note 4 at para 55; Woolley,
ULEC, supra note 5 at 184-186; Dodek, SCP, ibid at 54-64. There are two lines of jurisprudence about
whether an unlawful end, such as a tort or breach of contract, would be excepted, see i.e. Dublin v
Montessori Jewish Day School of Toronto, [2007] 85 OR (3d) 511, 281 DLR (4th) 366 (ON Sup Ct J)
(leave to appeal was granted but abandoned); Blank v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2015 FC 956. See
also Industrial Alliance Securities Inc. v Kunicyn, 2020 ONSC 3393.
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the administration of justice.48 The codes of conduct do not expressly
address the crime-fraud exclusion, but given that these communications
are excluded from solicitor-client privilege, they are likely also excluded
from the ethical duty.49 I will explain both solicitor-client privilege and
confidentiality in more detail, before examining the future harm exception.
1. Solicitor-client privilege
The Supreme Court of Canada has described solicitor-client privilege
as “one of the most ancient and powerful privileges known to our
jurisprudence.”50 Adam Dodek has called solicitor-client privilege the
“strongest privilege protected by law.”51 Solicitor-client privilege began as
a rule of evidence but it has evolved into a “quasi-constitutional right,”52
and a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter.53
Solicitor-client privilege protects communications between the lawyer
and client made for the purpose of giving and receiving legal advice.54 In
other words, it does not typically protect communications between third
parties and a lawyer (except a lawyer’s agent, as in Smith v Jones).55 Where
a lawyer works in multiple capacities (e.g. as in-house counsel) legal
advice is distinguished from other types of advice. But if the lawyer’s sole
purpose is to provide legal advice, solicitor-client privilege will protect
the full continuum of communications between the lawyer and client,
including written and verbal communications as well as demeanour, tone
and volume of speech, facial expressions, and gestures.56 As a result, all
the lawful communications between a family lawyer and her client are
protected by solicitor-client privilege.
2. The ethical duty of confidentiality
The ethical duty of confidentiality is distinct from solicitor-client privilege,
and it is broader. The duty of confidentiality can be found in professional
codes of conduct. The Model Code, which is almost mirrored by most
48. See Dodek, SCP, ibid at 68.
49. See Woolley, ULEC, supra note 5 at 187.
50. R v National Post, 2010 SCC 16 at para 39.
51. Dodek, SCP, supra note 34 at 1.
52. Dodek, SCP, ibid at 3 and 18-21 (the following cases elevated solicitor-client privilege from a
rule of evidence to a quasi-constitutional right: Campbell, supra note 44; Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz
v Canada (Attorney General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v Canada (Attorney General); R v Fink,
2002 SCC 61, Smith, supra note 4; McClure, supra note 2).
53. See McClure, ibid at para 41.
54. See John H Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence, McNaughton rev ed (Boston: Little Brown, 1961)
at vol 8 s 2292; R v Howley, [1927] SCR 529, 3 DLR 265 at para 11; Dodek, SCP, supra note 34 at
48-49.
55. See Smith, supra note 4 at paras 9-18; Dodek, SCP, ibid at 38.
56. See R v Amsel, 2017 MBPC 52 at para 27 [Amsel]; Dodek, SCP, ibid at 49-53.
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provincial and territorial law societies, provides that “a lawyer at all times
must hold in strict confidence all information concerning the business and
affairs of a client acquired in the course of the professional relationship.”57
The rule captures all oral and written information and communications
between the lawyer and client throughout the solicitor-client relationship.58
It includes information a lawyer receives about the client from a third
party, and it applies regardless of whether others know the information.59
In other words, if a client’s child divulged information to their parent’s
lawyer, that information is not privileged, only confidential. Everything
that is privileged is confidential, but not everything that is confidential
is protected by solicitor-client privilege.60 As will be seen, however, the
distinction between solicitor-client privilege and the duty of confidentiality
has little significance for the future harm exception.
3. The future harm exception (a.k.a. the public safety exception)
Exceptions to solicitor-client privilege and confidentiality are very rare.
We place a high value on preserving client confidences, maintaining the
duty of loyalty, and ensuring a client has access to the law. The idea that
a lawyer can violate that relationship by divulging protected information
contrary to her client’s interests is in direct tension with the lawyer’s role.
An exception means the communication was protected but a competing
public policy reason overrides the protection. The public policy reason
for the future harm exception is safeguarding the public’s physical and
psychological safety.61 The Supreme Court of Canada established the
public safety exception to solicitor-client privilege in Smith v Jones when
they held that “[d]anger to public safety” can justify setting aside the
privilege.62 A commonly used example is where a lawyer learns there is
a bomb in a central train station set to explode at rush hour;63 a singular
event that is imminent, huge, and so disastrous that it would be immoral
for a lawyer to remain silent.

57. Model Code, supra note 4 at Rs 3.3-1, 3.3-3, 3.3-4, 3.3-5, 3.3-6, and 3.3-7 (the information can
only be divulged pursuant to an exception).
58. See Dodek, SCP, supra note 34 at 118-119.
59. See Model Code, supra note 4 at R 3.3-1[2].
60. See Dodek, SCP, supra note 34 at 21-23. See generally Woolley, ULEC, supra note 5 at 179-182,
188-193.
61. Although the dissent argued that an exception does not promote public safety but rather
encourages a criminal accused to stay silent instead of seeking medical treatment, see: Smith, supra
note 4 at paras 19-23. See also Adam Dodek, “The Public Safety Exception to Solicitor-Client
Privilege: Smith v Jones” (2000) 34 UBC L Rev 293 at 308-309 [Dodek, Smith].
62. Smith, ibid at para 75.
63. See Freedman, Confidentiality, supra note 19 at 1632.

The Future Harm Exception: Coercive Control as Serious
Psychological Harm and the Challenge for Lawyers’ Ethics

11

In Smith v Jones, a man was charged with aggravated sexual assault
of a prostitute.64 The expert, a psychiatrist (whose communications were
protected by solicitor-client privilege because the protection is extended
to agents and experts retained by a lawyer65) wanted to reveal that the
accused had plans to kidnap, rape, and murder prostitutes and that he was
likely to act on those plans if he did not have treatment.66 To determine
whether public safety outweighs solicitor-client privilege, the Court held
that there must be “an imminent risk of serious bodily harm or death to an
identifiable person or group.”67 The three prongs of the test—“seriousness,
clarity, and imminence”—will “overlap and vary in their importance and
significance” and so their weight will vary depending on the context.68
If the test is met, a lawyer (or her agent) may disclose a limited amount
of information to prevent the harm.69 Justice Cory did not clearly state
whether a lawyer is required to disclose if the test is met.70
To determine whether there is a “clear” risk, Cory said the intended
victim(s) must be an “identifiable person or group of persons.”71 There
should be consideration of whether there is a method of attack and “long
range planning,” a “prior history of violence or threats of violence,” and
prior assaults or threats similar to what is planned.72 If there is a “history
of violence,” the question is whether it has increased in severity.73 All of
the “surrounding circumstances” must be considered.74
To constitute a “serious” threat, there must be danger that the victim(s)
will be “killed” or suffer “serious bodily harm.”75 Planning future crimes
“without an element of violence” does not meet the test.76 The Court
did not hinge seriousness on a criminal act; instead, they focused on the
harm that will be inflicted. Importantly for victims of coercive control,
Cory also said that “serious psychological harm may constitute serious

64. See Smith, supra note 4 at para 36.
65. See Smith, ibid at paras 9-18; Dodek, Smith, supra note 61 at 314; Dodek, SCP, supra note 34 at
38.
66. See Smith, ibid at paras 9-18 and 36-41.
67. Smith, ibid at para 78.
68. Smith, ibid at paras 78 and 85.
69. See Smith, ibid at para 86.
70. See Renke, supra note 5 at 1059-1061; Dodek, Duty, supra note 5 at 216-219; Woolley, ULEC,
supra note 5 at 216; Tanovich, supra note 5 at 297.
71. Smith, supra note 4 at paras 79-80.
72. Smith, ibid at para 79.
73. Smith, ibid at para 79.
74. Smith, ibid at para 80.
75. Smith, ibid at paras 82.
76. Smith, ibid at paras 82.
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bodily harm.”77 In doing so, the Court relied on R v McCraw.78 In that
case, the Supreme Court held that the threat of rape can constitute serious
psychological harm.79 They did not define psychological harm, only that
it “substantially interferes” with a person’s “health or well-being”, and it
may be more “pervasive and permanent…than…physical harm.”80 There
is no subsequent jurisprudence dealing with the issue of psychological
harm, and little guidance on what psychological harm means in that
context.81 There is no jurisprudence or guidance from any law society on
whether coercive control would constitute serious psychological harm for
the purpose of the exception. There is also limited jurisprudence dealing
with the future harm exception and family violence generally.82 Use of the
future harm exception is rare.83
Finally, the Court in Smith v Jones held that “imminence” does not
mean immediate. They emphasized that context is critical. The harm can
be imminent even if it does not manifest for a period of time as long as
it “creates a sense of urgency” that is “applicable [at] some time in the
future.”84 A sense of urgency and clarity is more important than establishing
the specific time when the threat will be carried out or the harm will be
inflicted.85
The test requires a lawyer or court to determine whether a “threat to
public safety outweighs the need to preserve solicitor-client privilege.”86
Justice Cory gave no helpful guidance on what type of threat may qualify,
particularly where there is uncertainty about the link between the act and
the harm.87 For example, it is easy to see that a would-be serial killer’s
actions would cause harm if he were able to go through with his plans. It
is less clear whether environmental contamination may cause illness in
77. Smith, ibid at para 83, citing R v McCraw, [1991] 3 SCR 72 49 OAC 47 at 81 [McCraw].
78. McCraw, ibid.
79. See McCraw, ibid at 88.
80. Smith, supra note 4 at para 83, citing R v McCraw, [1991] 3 SCR 72 (SCC) at 81.
81. See generally Dodek, SCP, supra note 35 at 263.
82. I noted up Smith v Jones on Westlaw and found 227 cases, of those, 3 cases use the phrase
“family violence” or “domestic violence,” and no cases use the phrases “coercive control” or “intimate
partner violence” (12 July 2020). See also Re TSZK, 2017 ABPC 270 at paras 35-44.
83. One of the few examples R v Butt, 2012 ONSC 4326 (HIV status of someone who confessed to
sexually assaulting a minor fell within the exception, but there was no analysis from the court).
84. Smith, supra note 4 at para 84.
85. See Smith, ibid at para 84.
86. Smith, ibid at para 85.
87. See Smith, ibid (he did not elaborate on what constitutes “public safety” but other examples
included are “a threat, put forward with chilling detail, to kill or seriously injure children five years of
age and under” and “a threat of death directed toward single women living in apartment buildings,”
but not “a general threat of death or violence directed to everyone in a city or community”); Dodek,
SCP, supra note 34 at 262-264.
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residents who live close to the toxic site.88 Or whether a spouse’s verbal
harassment and control over the couple’s financial lives would cause his
partner serious psychological harm. Adam Dodek,89 David Tanovich,90
and Wayne Renke91 have raised questions about other specific scenarios
and whether they may qualify, including, the transmission of infectious
diseases,92 cyber security issues, importing large quantities of illegal
drugs,93 or defective medical, drug or vehicle products.94 In essence, there
is confusion about what type of threat qualifies; the exception seems to
prioritize public safety in the obvious cases of physical violence.
At the time of Smith v Jones, law societies had already recognized a
public safety exception, but it was not uniform.95 Since then, the decision
has been codified by all Canadian law societies.96 This means the exception
applies to both confidentiality and solicitor-client privilege. However, the
law societies of Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and New Brunswick require
disclosure of confidential information when the test is met;97 whereas the
other law societies’ rules are discretionary.98 Saskatchewan and Manitoba
both relieve lawyers from the obligation if the lawyer believes disclosure
will “bring harm upon the lawyer or the lawyer’s family or colleagues”99
(for example, through retaliation or a threat of retaliation100).
The discretionary aspect of the exception in most jurisdictions means
that it is up to the lawyer whether to disclose what she knows, even when
the test is met. Meaning, if a lawyer is satisfied that the test is met, even
with a court order confirming it, she is not required to disclose. The Model
Code suggests that she should consider whether there is another way to
prevent the harm,101 but ultimately, the choice is hers. If she does disclose,

88. See generally Tanovich, supra note 5 at 300; Dodek, SCP, ibid at 264.
89. See generally Dodek, SCP, ibid at 261-264.
90. See Tanovich, supra note 5 at 299.
91. See Renke, supra note 5 at 1056.
92. See Dodek, SCP, supra note 34 at 261-262.
93. See Renke, supra note 5 at 1056.
94. See Tanovich, supra note 5 at 299.
95. See Smith, supra note 4 at para 75; Dodek, Smith, supra note 61 at 312; Dodek, Duty, supra note
5 at 217-218.
96. See i.e. Model Code, supra note 4 at R 3.3-3; Law Society of Ontario, Rules of Professional
Conduct, Toronto, ON: Law Society of Ontario, 2019, R 3.3-3 [LSO]; Law Society of Alberta, Code
of Conduct, Calgary, AB: Law Society Alberta, 2020, R 3.3-3 [LSA].
97. See: LSS, supra note 5 at R 3.3-3A; LSM, supra note 5 at R 3.3-3A; LSNB, supra note 5 at R
3.3-3A.
98. See i.e. Model Code, supra note 4 at R 3.3-3; LSO, supra note 96 at R 3.3-3; LSA, supra note
96 at R 3.3-3.
99. LSS, supra note 5 at R 3.3-3A[5]; LSM, supra note 5 at R 3.3-3A[4].
100. See LSS, ibid at R 3.3-3A[5]; LSM, ibid at R 3.3-3A[4].
101. See Model Code, supra note 4 at R 3.3-3[3](b).
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there is very little guidance to help her decide who to tell. Both the Supreme
Court and the Federation have refrained from providing guidelines to help
a lawyer determine who they might disclose to because the choice depends
on the “specific circumstances.”102 As a result, where there is coercive
control, the lawyer might disclose to opposing counsel, the victim, child
protective services, the police, or whomever the lawyer reasonably believes
can prevent the harm. Once disclosed, the communication is essentially
protected again.103
Adam Dodek argues that the ruling in Smith v Jones was confusing
about the discretionary nature of the test, the Court used “the logic of
duty but the language of discretion.”104 Given the sanctity of the protection
and the extraordinary nature of the exception, a lawyer should be required
to disclose to protect public safety when the test is met. Alice Woolley
also argued that the test should be mandatory.105 Given that law reflects
what society has decided is moral, she argued that the lawyer’s only job
should be to determine whether the test is met. A lawyer should not have
to determine whether to disclose.106
In my view discretion regarding disclosure is helpful in the context
of family violence for two reasons. As identified by the law societies of
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and New Brunswick,107 if an abuser’s lawyer
were to violate her client’s trust by disclosing protected information it
would sever the trust the solicitor-client relationship depends on, and the
betrayal may provoke him. In my view, a lawyer is entitled to weigh the
risk to her own safety in making that decision.108
Second, the client may not be the one posing a threat.109 The exception
was conceptualized in response to a clear and imminent threat posed by a
would-be serial killer. The exception did not consider a situation where the
102. Smith, supra note 4 at para 97. See also: Model Code, ibid at R 3.3-3[4]; Dodek, SCP, supra note
34 at 267-269.
103. See Amsel, supra note 56 at paras 31-34.
104. Dodek, SCP, supra note 34 at 265.
105. See Woolley, ULEC, supra note 5 at 237-238.
106. See Woolley, ULEC, ibid at 237-238.
107. See LSS, supra note 5 at R 3.3-3A; LSM, supra note 5 at R 3.3-3A; LSNB, supra note 5 at R
3.3-3A.
108. See generally R v Amsel, 2017 MBPC 58; Amsel, supra note 56; R v Amsel, 2018 MBPC 19; R
v Amsel, 2018 MBPC 46; Katie Dangerfield, “A bitter, lengthy divorce and a homemade bomb. How
Guido Amsel cost a Winnipeg lawyer her hand” (22 November 2018), online: Global News <https://
globalnews.ca/news/4688492/guido-amsel-letter-bomber-divorce-lawyer/>
[perma.cc/7XBVDTAD].
109. This argument is taken from my earlier Slaw column, see: Deanne Sowter, “A Lawyer’s Duty to
(Sometimes) Report a Child in Need of Protection” (26 February 2020), online (blog): Slaw <www.
slaw.ca/2020/02/26/a-lawyers-duty-to-sometimes-report-a-child-in-need-of-protection/> [perma.cc/
H3HX-4M8A].
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privilege-holder reveals the threat but is not the perpetrator of the harm.
Where there is family violence, the client may be a victim. If a lawyer
reported information without her client’s consent, she may revictimize her
client and increase the risk by inflaming the abuser. Discretion allows a
lawyer to maintain her loyalty to her client by discussing the situation
and getting instructions on how to proceed. A client may be unwilling or
unable to do what seems objectively safest and discretion gives a lawyer
the ability to disclose, if necessary. Ultimately, discretion places the
lawyer in the uncomfortable position of determining a course of action
absent client instructions and direction from the law, but family violence
complicates established norms in many ways, and this is one of them.
II. Coercive control
There is no universal definition of coercive control. The British Columbia
Family Law Act (BC FLA) and the newly amended Divorce Act both
contain a broad definition of “family violence” that includes coercive
control.110 Coercive control is also recognized at common law.111 What
is confusing is that sometimes coercive control tactics are folded into
descriptions of domestic violence, intimate partner violence (IPV),
and battering.112 There are at least five different IPV topologies,113 such
as “situational couple violence” which typically refers to violence both
parties perpetuate towards the other.114 In contrast, coercive control is one-

110. See Divorce Act, supra note 23; Bill C-78, supra note 23 at ss 1(7) and 16(4) (tactics include
“physical abuse,” “sexual abuse,” “threats,” “stalking,” “failure to provide the necessaries of life,”
“psychological abuse,” “financial abuse,” and threatening, damaging, or killing animals or property);
BC FLA, supra note 22 at s 1 (includes “psychological or emotional abuse” such as “intimidation,
harassment, coercion or threats, including threats respecting other persons, pets or property,” and it
emphasizes control by including “unreasonable restrictions on, or prevention of, a family member’s
financial or personal autonomy”). See also: Bill 207, supra note 22 at ss 18(1-2) and 24(3-4).
For an overview of how the rest of the Canadian provinces and territories respond to family
violence, see generally: Jennifer Koshan, Janet Mosher & Wanda Wiegers, “The Costs of Justice in
Domestic Violence Cases: Mapping Canadian Law and Policy” in Trevor Farrow & Les Jacobs, eds,
The Justice Crisis: The Cost and Value of Accessing Law (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2020) [Koshan
et al, Mapping].
111. See NDL v MSL, 2010 NSSC 68 at para 34; C(JR) v C(SJ), 2010 NSSC 85.
112. See Sheehy, supra note 15 at 12; Luke’s Place Report, supra note 1 at 6-10. See also: Sylvia
Walby & Jude Towers, “Untangling the Concept of Coercive Control: Theorizing Domestic Violence
Crime” (2018) 18:1 Criminology & Criminal Justice 7.
113. See Wangmann, supra note 9 at 5 (coercive control, violent resistance, situational couple
violence, separation-instigated violence, mutual control violence). See also: Report of the FederalProvincial-Territorial (FPT) Ad Hoc Working Group on Family Violence, “Making the Links in
Family Violence Cases: Collaboration among the Family, Child Protection and Criminal Justice
Systems—Vol 1” (2013) At 20-23, online (pdf): Department of Justice <www.justice.gc.ca> [perma.
cc/YSK3-W3G4] [Working Group Report].
114. Luke’s Place Report, supra note 1 at 8-10. See also: Wangmann, ibid at 3.
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sided, such that the victim is entrapped by her abuser.115 I have chosen
to focus on coercive control because of the emphasis on psychological
harm and the lack of a requirement for physical violence.116 Psychological
harm is harder to identify than bruises and broken bones, yet the harm is
understood to be longer-lasting and more severe suggesting a heightened
need for intervention.117 Finally, although there are competing definitions
of coercive control that are distinguishable based on a requirement for
physical violence plus controlling behaviours,118 I have chosen to focus on
Stark’s research, who was the first to develop the term,119 because his work
emphasizes psychological harm rather than physical harm—which easily
falls within the future harm exception.
Coercive control has two distinguishing features: the pattern of
tactics, and the motivation to create a “willing victim.”120 The abuser is not
someone who is responding to a conflict—for example, an ordinary fight
or an abusive outburst because of a perceived wrong. It is not a conflict
between equals, because there is a lack of reciprocity. Coercive control is
about male domination and control empowered by family and social norms,
not through reliance on “raw power alone.”121 Although coercive control
is not confined to low-income or marginalized populations, immigration,
housing, and child welfare issues can be leveraged by an abuser to further
entrap his victim because her primary survival is contingent upon him
and she is unable to access social supports—she may not speak English,
be undocumented, or be ill-equipped to earn an income.122 In short, the
abuser uses a pattern of physical, emotional, psychological, and financial
tactics to exert control. Stark uses the analogy of thinking of the victim as a
hostage—a victim of a “capture crime.”123 The abuser “requires gratitude,
admiration, and love.”124
There are no Canadian statistics about coercive control, but IPV
statistics are starting to reveal its prevalence. Because coercive control
115. See Luke’s Place Report, ibid at 8-10. See generally: Joan S Meier, “Dangerous Liaisons: A
Domestic Violence Typology in Custody Litigation” (2017) 70:1 Rutgers UL Rev 115; Wangmann,
ibid.
116. See Stark and Hester, supra note 9 at 89.
117. See Luke’s Place Report, supra note 1 at 9.
118. See Johnson, supra note 9 at 1-28; Wangmann, supra note 9 at 4 and 13-14.
119. See generally Stark, CC, supra note 8.
120. Sheehy, supra note 15 at 3.
121. Stark, CC, supra note 8 at 105. See also Stark & Hester, supra note 9 at 91.
122. See generally Janet Mosher, “Grounding Access to Justice Theory and Practice in the Experiences
of Women Abused by their Intimate Partners” (2015) 32 Windsor YB Access Just 149 [Mosher];
Walby & Towers, supra note 113 at 21.
123. Stark, CC, supra note 8 at 204-205.
124. Sheehy, supra note 15 at 3.
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involves a pattern of various tactics, both police-reported violence and
self-reported violence should be considered.125 The existing criminal
offences are for individual tactics,126 such as assault and bodily harm,
sexual assault, criminal harassment, and the threat to cause bodily harm;127
no offence recognizes the pattern of tactics that constitutes coercive
control. Of all police-reported violent crime in 2019, 30 per cent was
caused by IPV, affecting 107,810 victims, primarily women.128 However,
only 19 per cent of spousal violence is reported to the police (by the victim
or by someone else).129 Most victims of coercive control do not report the
abuse, presumably because it is not a criminal offence, but also because
the victim may be financially dependent on her abuser, they may have
children together,130 or she may “not feel safe calling the police.”131 We do
not know how many instances of police-reported violence also involved
coercive control.
When IPV (not just coercive control) is defined to include both
criminal and non-criminal conduct, approximately “6.2 million women 15
years of age and older [report] experiencing some kind of psychological,
physical, or sexual violence in the context of an intimate relationship in
their lifetime.”132 Statistics Canada has measured three different types
of violence (psychological, physical, and sexual) through twenty-seven
distinct types of abuse133 and found that 30 per cent of female victims of
125. See Shana Conroy, Statistics Canada, “Spousal Violence in Canada, 2019” (6 October 2021)
at 4, online (pdf): Statistics Canada <www150.statcan.gc.ca> [perma.cc/ZD5Z-LYD4] [Spousal
Violence].
126. For example stalking, see Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 264, 372(2) and (3) [CCC];
Marta Burczycka & Shana Conroy, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, “Family Violence in
Canada: A statistical profile, 2016” (17 January 2018) at 4, online (pdf): Statistics Canada <www150.
statcan.gc.ca> [perma.cc/E5G4-V7NY] (in 2014, 8 per cent of women were stalked and 21 per cent of
victims were stalked by a current or former intimate partner) [Justice Stats, 2016].
127. See CCC, ibid at ss 229-239, 264, 264.1, 265-269, 271-273, 278, and 430.
128. See Shana Conroy, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, “Family Violence in Canada: a
statistical profile, 2019” (2 March 2021) at 29, online (pdf): Statistics Canada <www150.statcan.
gc.ca> [perma.cc/G6AA-B9UX].
129. See Government of Canada, “Family violence: How big is the problem in Canada?” (31 May
2018), online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/en/public-health> [perma.cc/G956-A4JB];
Spousal Violence, supra note 125 at 11.
130. See Spousal Violence, ibid at 4 and 11.
131. Haley Hrymak & Kim Hawkins, “Why Can’t Everyone Just Get Along? How BC’s Family
Law System Puts Survivors in Danger” (January 2021) at 39, online (pdf): Women’s Legal Centre
<womenslegalcentre.ca> [perma.cc/QS9G-4FVQ] [Rise Report].
132. Adam Cotter, Statistics Canada, “Intimate Partner Violence in Canada, 2018: An Overview” (26
April 2021) at 5, online (pdf): Statistics Canada <www150.statcan.gc.ca> [perma.cc/A4BN-8EMC]
[IPV, 2018].
133. See IPV, 2018, ibid at 4 (“Psychological violence” includes “abuse that target a person’s
emotional, mental, or financial well-being, or impede their personal freedom or sense of safety” such
as “jealousy, name-calling and other put-downs, stalking or harassing behaviours, manipulation,
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IPV experienced at least one type of abuse repeatedly, “either on a monthly
basis or more often.”134 Psychological abuse is reported to be the “most
common type of IPV.”135 One in three victims experience ten or more
different tactics.136 When considering the range of tactics, 26 percent of
victims of emotional or financial abuse also experience spousal violence.137
Combined, these statistics indicate that approximately 30 percent of IPV
victims experience abusive suggestive of coercive control.
In 2015, the UK became the first country in the world to criminalize
coercive control,138 so their data is illuminative. For the year ending March
2019, there were 17,616 police-recorded instances of coercive control.139
Police laid 1,177 charges, and where coercive control was the principal
offence there were 516 defendants prosecuted. Of those, 97 per cent
were male, and 308 were convicted for coercive control.140 It is not clear
why there is a disparity between the prevalence of reports, instances and
charges; however, the data does indicate the scope of coercive control that
may be occurring in Canada.
There is a direct link between coercive control and an increased risk
of fatality.141 In Canada, a woman or girl is killed by violence every 2.5
confinement, or property damage”; “physical violence” includes “physical assault or the threat of
physical assault…items being thrown at the victim, being threatened with a weapon, being slapped,
being beaten, and being choked”; and “sexual violence” includes “sexual assault or threats of sexual
assault…being made to perform sex acts that the victim did not want to perform, and forcing or
attempting to force the victim to have sex”).
134. See IPV, 2018, ibid at 7.
135. IPV, 2018, ibid at 5. See also Rise Report, supra note 131 at 24-25.
136. See IPV, 2018, ibid at 5.
137. See Spousal Violence, supra note 125 at 10 (spousal violence includes physical and sexual
assault that is criminal, and behaviour that does not reach the criminal threshold such as slapping,
pushing, shoving, or throwing something at the person that could have hurt them).
138. See Serious Crime Act 2015, UK Public General Acts, 2015 c 9 Part 5 at s 76. See generally
Vanessa Bettinson & Charlotte Bishop, “Is the Creation of a Discrete Offence of Coercive Control
Necessary to Combat Domestic Violence” (2015) 66 N Ir Leg Q 179 at 190 [Bettinson & Bishop,
Offence]; Ciara Nugent, “’Abuse is a Pattern.’ Why These Nations Took the Lead in Criminalizing
Controlling Behaviour in Relationships” (21 June 2019), online: Time <time.com/5610016/coercivecontrol-domestic-violence/> [perma.cc/UUF3-3AW7] [Nugent]; Stark, CC, supra note 8 at 382-384.
139. See Office for National Statistics, “Domestic Abuse and the Criminal Justice System, England
and Wales: November 2019” (25 November 2019) at 5, online (pdf): Office for National Statistics
<www.ons.gov.uk> [perma.cc/QF52-JPQQ] [ONS 2019].
140. See ONS 2019, ibid at 26.
141. Death may not be caused by murder. See Stark, CC, supra note 8 at 233 (Stark describes a case
involving a woman who was diagnosed with cancer, whose husband flew into a rage when she was
diagnosed. He pinned her against the wall and sprayed her with Raid as his “cure.” He insisted that
she use a different hospital than the one he worked at and he insisted that she leave the hospital against
medical advice. She developed sepsis and might have died but for the help of her daughter).
See also BBC News, “Husband not culpable for suicide” (16 May 2006), online: BBC News
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/4785728.stm> [perma.cc/9UYA-QPVL] (R v
Dhaliwal brought the impact of coercive control into the UK media’s purview. In that case, a victim
of coercive control committed suicide. A clinical psychologist confirmed that she had sustained
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days; of those, 53 per cent are killed by male partners, and 13 per cent
are killed by male family members.142 Common indicators or motives for
gender-based murder include coercive control, jealousy, and separation.143
In a study that looked at 224 cases involving family violence and uxoricide
they found that if the abuser was both “highly controlling” and physically
violent, there was a nine times greater chance he would kill his partner upon
separation.144 Another study showed that the presence of coercive control
was “four times more likely than the presence of violence to explain the
post-separation escalation of violence.”145 The level of control is a better
predictor of future severe assaults and death than physical violence alone
because the psychological harm inflicted on the victim compromises her
capacity to resist abuse.146 Immediately following separation–when she
is most likely to talk to a lawyer–poses the highest risk to the survivor.147
Nearly half (49 per cent) of all spousal homicides occur within two months
after separation.148 In short, coercive control increases the risk of fatality
during the period that both parties are most likely to retain counsel.

“psychological injury, characterized by features of depression” and PTSD as a result of domestic
violence which led to her suicide.) [BBC]; Bettinson & Bishop, Offence, supra note 138 at 186-187
(The Crown charged her husband with manslaughter and argued that the psychological harm she
suffered amounted to bodily harm, causing her to commit suicide. The argument failed because the
court did not recognize the impact of abuse absent a diagnosis of battered woman’s syndrome or
PTSD.).
Risk of fatality can extend to the children. See generally Peter Jaffe et al, Canada, “Risk Factors
for Children in Situations of Family Violence in the Context of Separation and Divorce” (February
2014) at 14-19, online (pdf): Department of Justice <justice.gc.ca> [perma.cc/D2CF-NPSY] [Jaffe et
al]; R v Berry, 2019 BCSC 2430; Lori Chambers, Deb Zweep & Nadia Verrelli, “Paternal Filicide and
Coercive Control: Reviewing the Evidence in Cotton v Berry” (2018) 51:3 UBC L Rev 671; Gillian
Calder & Susan Boyd, “Comment: Connecting the dots in family-violence cases” (3 January 2018),
online: Times Colonist <www.timescolonist.com> [perma.cc/5X5M-PG7C].
142. See Myrna Dawson et al, “#CallItFemicide: Understanding Gender-Related Killings of Women
and Girls in Canada 2018” (2018) at 7, online (pdf): Canadian Femicide Observatory for Justice
and Accountability <femicideincanada.ca/callitfemicide.pdf> [perma.cc/9UYA-QPVL] [Femicide
Report].
143. See Femicide Report, ibid at 38-41.
144. Stark, CC, supra note 8 at 277 citing Nancy Glass, Jennifer Manganello & Jacquelyn C Campbell,
“Risk for Intimate Partner Femicide in Violent Relationships” DV Report 9, no 2 (December 2003 /
January 2004) at 1-2 and 30-33.
145. Stark, Re-presenting, supra note 8 at 13.
146. See Stark, Re-presenting, ibid at 4.
147. Cynthia Chewter, “Best Practices for Representing Clients in Family Violence Cases” (2015),
online: Department of Justice <justice.gc.ca> [perma.cc/D2CF-NPSY].
148. See Tina Hotton, “Spousal Violence after Marital Separation” (2001) at 7, online (pdf): Statistics
Canada <www150.statcan.gc.ca> [perma.cc/H83Y-PLZB] (length of separation at the time of the
murder: 49 per cent (2 months or less), 32 per cent (2 months to 1 year), 19 per cent(1 year or more)).
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1. The psychological harm caused by coercive control
Where there is coercive control, the cumulative pattern of tactics causes
the psychological harm, not the individual tactics in isolation.149 The victim
becomes trapped in her “personal life.”150 The impact of coercive control
on a victim is captured in the following quote from a survivor:
What I remember most is that it’s like being put in a box. How you
end up there is the biggest trick—I never managed to work that one
out. Maybe you think it’s a treasure box at first: you’re in there because
you’re special. Soon the box starts to shrink. Every time you touch the
edges there is an argument. So you try to make yourself fit. You curl up,
become smaller, quieter, remove the excessive, offensive part of your
personality. You eliminate people and interests, change your behavior.
But still the box gets smaller. You think it’s your fault. You don’t realize
that the box is shrinking, or who is making it smaller. You don’t yet
understand that you will never, ever be tiny enough to fit.151

Coercive control can cause serious psychological harm;152 a “hostagelike condition of entrapment that arises from the suppression of a victim’s
autonomy, rights and liberties.”153 The description of a box echoes Stark’s
theory of coercive control, as something that creates a “cage” around
the victim.154 Each tactic is another bar, trapping the victim inside her
own life.155 Kristy Candela found “the most frequent psychological
effects of coercive control are fear and anxiety, loss of self-esteem,
and depression.”156 Four in ten victims of IPV (broadly defined) report
being afraid of their partner, and those who experience a range of tactics
“experience greater levels of fear.”157 Victims of coercive control lose their
jobs, friends, families, and other sources of support. They lose their “sense
of self.”158 They are forced to “violate their own boundaries and moral

149. See Kristy Candela, “Protecting the Invisible Victim: Incorporating Coercive Control in
Domestic Violence Statues” (2016) 54 Fam Ct Rev 112 at 116; Stark, Re-presenting, supra note 8 at
115.
150. Candela, ibid at 113.
151. Candela, ibid at 112.
152. See Luke’s Place Report, supra note 1 at 9-10; Bettinson & Bishop, Offence, supra note 138
at 183-185; Stark, CC, supra note 8 at 228-229. Cf Heather Douglas, Bridget A Harris & Molly
Dragiewicz, “Technology-Facilitated Domestic and Family Violence: Women’s Experiences” (2019)
59 Brit J Criminol 551 at 555 [Douglas et al]; Margaret B Drew, “Collaboration and Intention: Making
the Collaborative Family Law Process Safe(r)” (2017) 32 Ohio St J Disp Resol 373 at 391 [Drew].
153. Stark, Re-presenting, supra note 8 at 5.
154. Stark, CC, supra note 8 at 198.
155. See Stark, CC, ibid at 198.
156. Candela, supra note 149 at 115.
157. IPV 2018, supra note 136 at 6.
158. Candela, supra note 149 at 115. See also Sheehy, supra note 15 at 3.
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codes.”159 They “forget who they are, and live in a world created by their
abusers.”160 Stark testified in R v Craig that coercive control would make a
victim feel “afraid of her abuser, feel trapped in the relationship, and [she]
would be under significant psychological and emotional stress.”161 The
abuser wants her “total surrender” and the abuse can lead her to commit
suicide.162 Moreover, the impact can continue post-separation causing fear,
“psychosocial, medical, and behavioral problems.”163
Coercive control is linked to PTSD, psychological trauma, and
complex PTSD.164 Research indicates that “any event or set of enduring
conditions” can be found to be traumatic if the person is unable to integrate
their emotional experience, or if they feel threatened.165 This includes
a psychological “threat to life or integrity,” including in the absence of
physical violence.166 About one in three women who experience IPV
tactics monthly or more often also report symptoms consistent with
PTSD.167 Complex PTSD is caused by never-ending trauma, often
associated with political kidnappings, prisoners of war, and members of
cults, due to the “inescapable nature of the abuse,” the “hypervigilance”
for the victim, and the requirement to “conform” to the abuser’s needs.168
The constant hypervigilance is traumatic, coupled with the “ongoing
verbal, psychological and emotional abuse, which the brain experiences
as threatening in the same way as a physical threat to life.”169
Coercive control is challenging for both the abuser and victim to
reveal.170 The abuser will not want to admit the truth of his conduct,
and the victim is trained to keep his conduct a secret out of fear of the
consequences, or humiliation.171 Moreover, victims of coercive control
“tend to minimize the abuse.”172 Research shows they have a distorted
sense of what is real, and will normalize and even “redefine” their own
159. Sheehy, ibid at 3.
160. Candela, supra note 149 at 116.
161. Craig, supra note 8 at para 28.
162. Sheehy, supra note 15 at 3. See also BBC, supra note 141.
163. Stark & Hester, supra note 9 at 90.
164. See Luke’s Place Report, supra note 1 at 14; Bishop & Bettinson, Evidence, supra note 15 at
11; Sheehy, supra note 15 at 2-3; Emma Williamson, “Living in the World of the Domestic Violence
Perpetrator: Negotiating the Unreality of Coercive Control” (2010) 16:12 Violence Against Women
1412 at 1416; Craig, supra note 8 at paras 24-31; Candela, supra note 149 at 115.
165. Bishop & Bettinson, Evidence, ibid at 11.
166. Bishop & Bettinson, Evidence, ibid.
167. See IPV 2018, supra note 132 at 8.
168. Bishop & Bettinson, Evidence, supra note 15 at 11. See also: Sheehy, supra note 15 at 2-3.
169. Bishop & Bettinson, Evidence, ibid at 11-12.
170. See Drew, supra note 152 at 385; Luke’s Place Report, supra note 1 at 14.
171. See Candela, supra note 149 at 113; Stark, Re-presenting, supra note 8 at 9.
172. Craig, supra note 8 at para 29.
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“reality to match” their abuser’s.173 As a result, a primary issue is whether
a lawyer can see the pattern.
2. The pattern of tactics
Stark based his theory of coercive control on the work of his feminist
predecessors and their development of the “Power and Control Wheel.”174
According to Stark, there are two distinct categories of tactics, those that
use “force or threats to compel or dispel a particular response” (‘coercion’),
and those that are “structural forms of deprivation, exploitation, and
command that compel obedience indirectly” (‘control’).175 Cases are not
predictable; abusers may not use the same tactics or all of the categories.
A relationship that is dominated by coercion looks different than one
dominated by control.176 One study found that survivors of coercive
control identified ten different tactics used against them throughout the
relationship.177 Abusers may use a variety of combinations; the pattern
depends on their effectiveness to humiliate, isolate, and control the
victim. The abuser will use trial and error to determine which are the most
effective.178 The only commonalities are the existence of a pattern and the
malevolent intent of the abuser.179 The following is an overview of the
types of tactics, primarily drawing from Stark’s work.
(a) Coercion tactics
Physical violence
Physical force is used to keep the victim in a state of dread and compliance,
establish dominance and prevent escape.180 Some abusers will use
physical violence early in the relationship to show his willingness to do
so.181 The threat of physical violence then becomes more devastating in

173. Bishop & Bettinson, Evidence, supra note 15 at 12.
174. Mosher, supra note 122 at 153. See generally Stark, CC, supra note 8 at 198-228; Luke’s Place
Report, supra note 1 at 11-12; Candela, supra note 149 at 115 (the wheel includes the following
tactics: “intimidation; emotional abuse; isolation; minimizing, denying, and blame; using children and
male privilege; economic abuse; and coercion and threats”).
175. Stark, CC, ibid at 228-229. See also Stark & Hester, supra note 9 at 89; Stark, Re-presenting,
supra note 8 at 8 (tactics that are “deployed to hurt and intimidate” are “coercion” tactics, and those
that are “designed to isolate and regulate” the victim are “control” tactics).
176. See Stark, CC, ibid at 241.
177. See Stark, CC, ibid at 275.
178. See Stark, CC, ibid at 206-207.
179. See Stark, CC, ibid at 241.
180. See Sheehy, supra note 15 at 3; Stark, CC, ibid at 242.
181. See Drew, supra note 152 at 388-389; Sheehy, ibid at 3. But see TEA v RLHC, 2019 BCSC 1042
at paras 173-176 (The expert suggested that physical violence would continue and not just occur once
at the beginning of the relationship.).
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the mind of the victim than actual violence.182 Often physical violence
is less severe but more frequent (i.e. shoving, slapping, kicking). Assault
becomes “a routine, like using the toilet” and not the result of a particular
conflict.183 Tactics can include frequent pushing, shoving, slapping,
smacking, twisting her arm, kicking, punching, using weapons; and more
severe violence, such as stabbing, choking, strangling, beating the victim
while she is asleep, and sexually assaulting her.184 Physical abuse may
also escalate post-separation.185 Whether physical violence is required to
establish coercive control is debated, however, Stark’s view is that not all
cases involve physical or sexual violence.186
Intimidation
Intimidation is used to keep the abuse a secret, and instill a sense of “fear,
dependence, compliance, loyalty and shame” in the victim.187 The goal
is to remind her that if she does not do what she is told, then whatever
harm he inflicted on her in the past will reoccur.188 Intimidation is achieved
through threats, gaslighting, surveillance, and degradation.189
Threats
An abuser will threaten to do anything that will intimidate the victim. He
will threaten to harm the children or have them taken away,190 or make her
choose between a child’s safety and her own. He will threaten to have the
victim committed, to assault her or kill her, or to commit suicide himself.
He will threaten to harm friends or family.191 He will also make threats
to withhold necessities of life, including prescription medication, food,
money, and clothes.192
Gaslighting
Gaslighting tactics are designed to make the victim feel “crazy.”193 For
example, an abuser might re-park the victim’s car during the night, so
182. See Stark, CC, supra note 8 at 251.
183. Stark, Re-presenting, supra note 8 at 9. See also Stark, CC, ibid at 244.
184. See Stark, Re-presenting, ibid at 8-9; Stark, CC, ibid at 242.
185. See Luke’s Place Report, supra note 1 at 11; Sheehy, supra note 15 at 3.
186. See Stark & Hester, supra note 9 at 89; Wangmann, supra note 9 at 13-15; Johnson, supra note
9 at 1-28.
187. Stark, Re-presenting, supra note 8 at 9.
188. See Bettinson & Bishop, Offence, supra note 138 at 184.
189. See Stark, Re-presenting, supra note 8 at 9; Stark, CC, supra note 8 at 249.
190. See Heather Douglas & Emma Fell, “Malicious Reports of Child Maltreatment as Coercive
Control: Mothers and Domestic and Family Violence” (2020) 35 J Family Violence; Stark, CC, ibid at
251; Mosher, supra note 122 at 157-158.
191. See Stark, Re-presenting, supra note 8 at 9-10; Sheehy, supra note 15 at 3.
192. See Stark, Re-presenting, ibid at 9-10; Stark, CC, supra note 8 at 253-254.
193. Stark, Re-presenting, ibid at 10. See also Stark, CC, ibid at 254-255.
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she feels crazy thinking she left it elsewhere. An abuser may remove car
parts, things around the house, or exploit secret fears.194 Stark provided an
example of a man who stole his wife’s expensive camera, got mad at her
for losing his gift, and then returned it to its place when the police came
to investigate.195 Where a court order prohibits contact, the abuser may
leave subtle signs that he was in the home.196 Technology also facilitates
gaslighting through smart home devices such as Wi-Fi enabled thermostats,
locks, lights, speakers, and doors. An abuser will change access codes and
turn devices on and off without being physically in the home, reminding
the victim of his power.197
Surveillance
Surveillance is used to deprive the victim of her privacy and tell her the
abuser is “omnipotent and omnipresent.”198 As a consequence, the victim
will go out less and become isolated.199 The abuser may use “check-ins”
to monitor behaviour, such as calling or texting throughout the day.200 For
example, he may require the victim to call him when she leaves the house
and when she returns. One twisted example provided by Stark was called
the “beeper game.”201 In that case, the victim was required to wear a beeper
when she was out without him. He would beep her using different numbers,
and her safety depended on guessing the significance. For example, a store
number meant she had to guess what shirt he wanted from that store.202 She
described breaking into a “cold sweat” when her beeper went.203
Surveillance tactics include stalking and cyber-stalking.204 One
study showed that abusers install tracking apps without consent (i.e.
installing a tracking device in a child’s toy to stalk the parent205). Cybersecurity company Kaspersky, found what is known as “stalkerware” or

194. See Stark, Re-presenting, ibid at 10; Stark, CC, ibid at 254-255.
195. See Stark, CC, ibid at 255.
196. See Stark, CC, ibid at 254.
197. See Nellie Bowles, “Thermostats, Locks and Lights: Digital Tools of Domestic Abuse” (23 June
2018), online: The New York Times <www.nytimes.com> [perma.cc/XMY2-LNDQ].
198. Stark, CC, supra note 8 at 255. See also Sheehy, supra note 15 at 3; Justice Stats, 2016, supra
note 126 at 18; Delanie Woodlock et al, “Technology as a Weapon in Domestic Violence: Responding
to Digital Coercive Control” (2019) Australian Social Work 1 at 5 [Woodlock et al].
199. See Stark, CC, ibid at 255.
200. Stark, CC, ibid at 257-258.
201. Stark, CC, ibid at 326-327.
202. See Stark, CC, ibid at 327.
203. Stark, CC, ibid at 198-199.
204. See generally Douglas et al, supra note 152; Jennifer Koshan, Janet Mosher & Wanda Wiegers,
“COVID-19, Domestic Violence, and Technology-Facilitated Abuse” (13 July 2020), online (blog):
Ablawg <https://ablawg.ca> [perma.cc/3JR4-GMSJ] [Koshan et al, Technology].
205. See Douglas et al, ibid at 561.
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“spouseware” on 37,532 devices between January and October 2019.206
Technology allows an abuser to monitor and track his victim.207
Degradation
Finally, an abuser may use tactics that are designed to degrade and
humiliate the victim.208 They may include name-calling, being verbally
abusive, and posting defamatory comments and personal or sexual images
on social media.209 This category also includes physical forms of abuse.
For example, the abuser may force his victim into degrading sexual acts
or to sleep in inhumane conditions. He may brand her by tattooing her,
burning her, or biting her to leave a mark.210 The goal is to deny the victim
any sense of self-respect. Women have been “forced to eat off the floor,
wear a leash, bark when they [want] supper, or beg for favours on their
knees.”211 In an example provided by Time Magazine, a police officer at a
scene of family violence saw a large dog cage and asked the victim where
the dog was. She replied: “We don’t have a dog. That’s for me.”212
(b) Control tactics
While coercion tactics are designed to intimidate the victim and keep her
in line, control tactics are designed to isolate and regulate the victim, to
control her.213 Control tactics impair the victim’s capacity for personal
gain and gratification, require her to conform to gender stereotypes, and
deprive her of the ability to escape.214
Isolation
The abuser will isolate his victim by inserting himself between her and the
outside world, so she must rely on him for information and recreation.215
206. Joe Tidy, “Stalkerware: The software that spies on your partner” (25 October 2019), online: BBC
News <www.bbc.com> [perma.cc/KAJ5-YQM4] (their work does not appear to be limited to one
jurisdiction).
207. See Thomas v Wohleber, 2020 ONSC 1965 [Thomas]; Woodlock et al, supra note 198 at 2;
Koshan et al, Technology, supra note 204.
208. BC courts have recognized derogatory remarks as emotional abuse when directed to or made in
the presence of a child. See i.e. KLL v DJ, 2014 BCPC 85 at paras 17-18; LAR v EJR, 2014 BCSC 966
at para 149; R(C) v M(A), 2015 BCPC 76 at paras 56-58 [R(C)]; L(DN) v S(CN), 2013 BCSC 809 at
para 58; Charnock v Charnock, 2016 BCSC 44 at paras 33-36. See also Susan B Boyd & Ruben Lindy,
“Violence Against Women and the BC Family Law Act: Early Jurisprudence” (2016) 35 CFLQ 101 at
105.
209. See Douglas et al, supra note 152 at 552.
210. See Stark, Re-presenting, supra note 8 at 11; Stark, CC, supra note 8 at 260; Sheehy, supra note
15 at 3.
211. Stark, CC, ibid at 258-259.
212. Nugent, supra note 138.
213. See Stark, Re-presenting, supra note 8 at 8.
214. See Stark, CC, supra note 8 at 271.
215. See Stark, CC, ibid at 262-263.
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Isolation tactics include: cutting the victim off from her support system,
forcing her to steal from friends or employers, and generally keeping her
house-bound.216 The abuser will try to make her dependent on him and
deprive her of autonomous decision-making.217 The victim’s friendships
with women threaten her abuser, so he monitors those friendships, denies
access to phones and cars so she cannot maintain them, interrogates her
about them, or insists on tagging along during visits.218
Financial control
Financial control is used to increase the victim’s dependence on her abuser
by depriving her “of any financial independence.”219 He will deny her
access to money (even if she earns an income), prohibit the use of credit
cards, and withhold information about family finances.220 Financial abuse
may continue and get worse after the relationship has ended if the abuser
withholds financial support or manipulates the justice system to maintain
financial control.221
Micromanagement
The final category of control tactics is micromanagement. The abuser will
manage every aspect of his victim’s life including what she watches on
TV, what websites she visits, how she dresses and wears her hair, and
how she parents their children, cooks, and cleans.222 For example, in one
case the abuser provided an itemized list of daily tasks and house rules
that were organized by room, including what type of potpourri to use and
a requirement to alphabetize CDs.223 In that case, the victim described
these tasks to Stark in a way that she owned them, she claimed she was
obsessive-compulsive.224 To survive, she had made “his reality hers.”225
3. Litigation harassment
Stark does not include litigation harassment in his framework, but it is
recognized that litigation can be another way to coerce and control.226 Two
216. See Stark, CC, ibid at 265; Sheehy, supra note 15 at 3.
217. See Stark, Re-presenting, supra note 8 at 12.
218. See Stark, CC, supra note 8 at 266-267; Stark, Re-presenting, ibid at 12.
219. Lieran Docherty et al, “Hidden in the Everyday: Financial Abuse as a Form of Intimate Partner
Violence in the Toronto Area” at 27, online (pdf): WomanACT <www.womanact.ca> [perma.cc/
EGH2-HZDD].
220. See Stark, Re-presenting, supra note 8 at 13.
221. See Docherty et al, supra note 219 at 27; Luke’s Place Report, supra note 1 at 12-13; Rise
Report, supra note 131 at 29.
222. See Stark, Re-presenting, supra note 8 at 13; Mosher, supra note 122 at 153-154.
223. See Stark, CC, supra note 8 at 318.
224. Stark, CC, ibid at 317-320.
225. Stark, CC, ibid at 320.
226. See generally Esther L Lenkinski, Barbara Orser & Alana Schwartz, “Legal Bullying: Abusive
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studies report that survivors feel revictimized by dealing with their former
partners through the justice system, causing feelings of “helplessness.”227
Legal disputes allow the abuser to contact the survivor under the pretext
of legitimate legal proceedings.228 This tactic may be overlooked because
the litigation may be wrongly justified as a legitimate exercise of legal
rights.229 Litigation harassment occurs when a spouse uses the justice
system to control and punish a former spouse;230 it is also known as “legal
bullying,”231 “systems abuse,”232 or “paper abuse.”233 Tactics include:
refusing to file court documents, filing late, filing incomplete statements,
self-representation when it is not necessary, bringing vexatious claims,
disobeying court orders, delaying, changing lawyers, refusing to negotiate,
making threats, bringing applications to review or vary, appealing, refusing
to disclose or withholding assets, and refusing to pay support.234
Courts in British Columbia have recognized litigation harassment
as a form of family violence.235 In one case, the court accepted that the
father’s threat to use his stronger financial position to fight the mother until
“she lives in a box” constituted “psychological and emotional abuse.”236
The father also used the following tactics: he called the mother names;
sent her demeaning text messages; threatened to tell their child, friends
and associates “vicious slurs” and threatened to make false allegations
to the police. He also made her take care of their child so he could “sleep
undisturbed,” was verbally abusive, and ultimately made her “afraid to
stand up to irrational, irresponsible behaviour because the consequences of

Litigation within Family Law Proceedings” (2003) 22 CFLQ 337 [Lenkinski et al]; Boyd & Lindy,
supra note 208 at 105 and 107; Koshan et al, Technology, supra note 204; Mosher, supra note 122;
Susan L Miller & Nicole L Smolter, “‘Paper Abuse’: When All Else Fails, Batterers Use Procedural
Stalking” (2011) 17(5) Violence Against Women 637; Lesley Laing, “Secondary Victimization:
Domestic Violence Survivors Navigating the Family Law System” (2017) 23:11 Violence Against
Women 1314.
227. Miller & Smolter, ibid at 642. See also Laing, ibid.
228. See Miller & Smolter, ibid at 237; Heather Douglas, “Legal Systems Abuse and Coercive
Control” (2018) 18:1 Criminology & Criminal Justice 84 at 94; Douglas & Fell, supra note 190 at 2.
229. See Douglas, ibid at 85; Miller & Smolter, ibid at 641.
230. See Mosher, supra note 122 at 158-159. See also Rise Report, supra note 131 at 30-36.
231. Lenkinski et al, supra note 226; Mosher, ibid at 158.
232. Douglas & Fell, supra note 190 at 2.
233. Miller & Smolter, supra note 226; Douglas, supra note 228 at 85; Mosher, supra note 122 at 158.
234. See Mosher, ibid at 158; Douglas, ibid at 91-92; Luke’s Place Report, supra note 1 at 13; Koshan
et al, Mapping, supra note 110 at 20; Douglas & Fell, supra note 190 at 2; Miller & Smolter, ibid at
637-638 and 641-642; Koshan et al, Technology, supra note 204.
235. See i.e. B(MW) v B(AR), 2013 BCSC 885 at paras 199-209; R(C), supra note 208 at paras 10 and
56-59; Boyd & Lindy, supra note 208 at 104; Hokhold v Gerbrandt, 2014 BCSC 1875 at paras 30,
131-132; aff’d 2015 BCCA 268; aff’d 2016 BCCA 159 [Hokhold].
236. R(C), ibid at paras 57-58.
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doing so [were] so dreadful.”237 The court found this behaviour constituted
coercive control.238
An abuser may also use children as “pawns” to exert control over
their mother.239 Stark explained that “one of the most effective ways of
gaining” control is by threatening to prevent the mother from seeing
her children.240 Children are used as a tactic by commencing a claim for
custody, ignoring parenting agreements, through claims of “alienation,”241
making false claims to child welfare authorities, asking a child to do things
that puts them at risk of harm if they fail to comply,242 or making them
complicit in the abuse.243 There is overwhelming evidence that children
who are exposed to family violence suffer from physical, developmental,
and psychological harm.244 In the context of coercive control, a child may
be used as a tactical pawn and therefore become a “secondary victim.”245
This term does not mean a child’s suffering is of “secondary importance”
but rather “because the children are almost always being harmed when,
why, and how they are to subordinate the mother.”246
A lawyer cannot participate in litigation harassment given her
obligation to the administration of justice.247 She cannot “knowingly assist
in or encourage any dishonesty, fraud, crime, or illegal conduct.”248 This
includes a requirement to be “on guard against becoming the tool or dupe
of an unscrupulous client.”249 And a lawyer cannot bring any proceedings
“motivated by malice” or brought “solely for the purpose of injuring the
237. R(C), ibid at para 56-59.
238. See R(C), ibid at para 59 (the finding of family violence led the court to require that access be
supervised).
239. Stark & Hester, supra note 9 at 96. See also: Laing, supra note 226 at 1315 and 1325.
240. Craig, supra note 8 at para 26.
241. Elizabeth Sheehy & Susan B Boyd, “Penalizing Women’s Fear: Intimate Partner Violence and
Parental Alienation in Canadian Child Custody Cases” (2020) 42:1 J Soc Welfare & Fam L 80 at 80
(In the context of IPV, the authors found that some judges focus on claims of alienation by the father,
instead of claims of IPV by the mother, engage in victim-blaming and heighten the risk for the mother
and children).
242. See Jaffe et al, supra note 141 at 14-19; Mosher, supra note 122 at 157-158; Miller & Smolter,
supra note 226 at 642; F(C) v V(D), 2015 BCPC 309 at paras 42, 46-56 and 75-76.
243. See Stark & Hester, supra note 9 at 98.
244. See generally Bill C-78, supra note 23 at ss 1(7), 16(3)(j), 16(4), 16.8(3) and 16.9(3); DNL v
CNS, 2014 BCSC 1417 at paras 71-75; LAR v EJR, 2014 BCSC 966; Jackson v Jackson, [2008] 50
RFL (6th) 149, OJ No 342 (Ont Sup Ct J) at paras 12-24; Neilson & Boyd, supra note 26 at 6-7; Senate
Committee, supra note 26 at 2-3; Jaffe et al, supra note 141 at 14-19; Boyd & Lindy, supra note 208.
245. Stark & Hester, supra note 9 at 96-98.
246. Stark & Hester, ibid at 96.
247. See generally Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law Societies, 2015 SCC 7; R v
Cunningham, 2010 SCC 10; McKercher, supra note 31; MacDonald Estate v Martin, [1990] 3 SCR
1235, 77 DLR (4th) 249.
248. Model Code, supra note 4 at R 3.2-7(a).
249. Ibid at R 3.2-7[1]. See also: Douglas, supra note 228 at 95.
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other party.”250 Together these professional obligations mean that a lawyer
must investigate her client’s motive.251 Her obligation is to approach the
law in good faith, not undermine it by allowing the justice system to be
manipulated. In short, a lawyer’s professional obligations require that
she refuse to follow her client’s instructions if they constitute litigation
harassment. The problem arises when conduct is lawful, but a lawyer is
concerned about the well-being of her client’s former spouse.
III. The future harm exception applied to coercive control
To use the future harm exception, a lawyer needs more than a mere
suspicion, she must be “satisfied” that she has enough evidence to meet the
test’s high threshold.252 There must be a strong likelihood that harm will
occur,253 but not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.254 If there is time, she
can obtain a court order to confirm that she may disclose the information.255
1. Clarity
The clarity prong of the test requires a clear risk that it is directed towards
a clearly “identifiable” person or group.256 Where there is coercive control,
the source of the risk and the identity of the survivor are both clearly
identifiable. It is obvious that the abuser is the source of the threat, and the
survivor is an identifiable person. Children of the relationship would also
qualify as identifiable persons.
To identify a clear risk, it means consideration of whether there is a
“prior history of violence or threats of violence,” prior assaults or threats
similar to what is planned, and whether the “history of violence” has
increased in severity.257 In Smith v Jones, the Court emphasized that all
of the “surrounding circumstances” must be considered.258 The test is not
limited to criminal acts or a tort; the conduct may be lawful259—the focus
is on the effect of the conduct.
Coercive control involves a pattern of abuse, the tactics often change
and in increase in severity post-separation,260 meaning there is a history
of abuse. This would make the history of violence aspect of the test easy
250. Ibid at R 5.1-2(a).
251. Cf Ibid at R 3.1-2.
252. See Ibid at R 3.3-3[1].
253. See Renke, supra note 5 at 1057; Dodek, SCP, supra note 34 at 264.
254. I am indebted to Malcolm Mercer for this point. See also Renke, ibid at 1057.
255. See Model Code, supra note 4 at R 3.3-3[4].
256. Smith, supra note 4 at para 79.
257. Ibid at para 79.
258. Ibid at para 80.
259. See Renke, supra note 5 at 1055.
260. See Stark & Hester, supra note 9 at 90; Wangmann, supra note 9 at 14-15; Mosher, supra note
122; Miller & Smolter, supra note 226; Laing, supra note 226; Douglas, supra note 228.
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to meet where there is coercive control. What may be challenging is
identifying the fact that there is coercive control, meaning identifying the
tactics and understanding their significance.261 It is much easier to apply
the test to the type of situation it was originally designed for, trying to stop
a would-be serial killer. A pattern of tactics, such as a making a victim
sleep in a dog cage, moving her car at night, or playing the beeper game
do not meet the test in isolation. They are morally abhorrent, but stopping
immoral behaviour is not the purpose of the exception. Moreover, the
context of those tactics is critical. The Court emphasized that context
matters,262 which is helpful; but given the gendered and cumulative nature
of this type of abuse, the pattern can be hard to identify.263 Individual
tactics may look like a “bad marriage” to a lawyer,264 which would make
sense given the breakdown of the relationship. Without training in family
violence and screening, an abuser’s lawyer may normalize his behaviour
by relying on gender stereotypes.265 For example, patriarchal and gendered
social norms can camouflage an abuser’s control over family finances.266
In other cases, some tactics can look like tokens of love and affection.267
An abuser will use a token as a signal to the survivor that there will be
consequences once they are alone, contributing to an atmosphere of fear,268
but his lawyer will not recognize the token for what it is. The private nature
of abuse complicates the evidence.269 Research shows that the survivor’s

261. In my view, a family lawyer is required to screen her client to be considered competent to
practice family law, see generally Sowter, (In)competence, supra note 27. See also Luke’s Place
Report, supra note 1. Screening tools are currently being developed, see generally “Enhanced
Safety: Risk Assessment Tool in Family Courts,” online (pdf): Barbara Schlifer Commerative Clinic
<www.schliferclinic.com> [perma.cc/ZAU8-M2QV]. However there are several complex challenges
including the competing typologies in the family violence literature, see i.e. Wangmann, ibid, and
whether lawyers should engage in risk assessments, see generally: Working Group Report, supra note
113 at 34-52, and the overall lack of training in family violence by family lawyers, see: Pamela Cross,
“Increasing Access to Justice through Lawyer Education” (28 January 2020), online (blog): Luke’s
Place <lukesplace.ca/increasing-access-to-justice-through-lawyer-education/> [perma.cc/Y37LBG8C].
262. See Smith, supra note 4 at para 84.
263. See generally Stark & Hester, supra note 9 at 96.
264. Stark, Re-presenting, supra note 8 at 15. See also Bishop & Bettinson, Evidence, supra note 15
at 8.
265. See Bishop & Bettinson, Evidence, ibid at 8-10. See also Sowter, (In)competence, supra note 27.
266. See Docherty et al, supra note 219 at 27.
267. See Bishop & Bettinson, Evidence, supra note 15 at 9; Stark, Re-presenting, supra note 8 at 9;
Stark, CC, supra note 8 at 229 (i.e. An abusive husband brought a sweater to his wife during a softball
game. To outsiders, the act looked like love and affection, but it caused the wife to fall apart. She knew
that it was a signal that she would need to cover the bruises on her arms later when he beat her for
drawing too much attention to herself during the game.).
268. See Bettinson & Bishop, Offence, supra note 138 at 184.
269. See generally Boyd & Lindy, supra note 208.
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cooperation is often required to have evidence of the harm she suffers.270
This presents a considerable challenge, as the abuser’s lawyer may have
a sense of the abuse and be concerned because his behaviour is becoming
alarming, but that is not enough to meet the test.
2. Serious psychological harm
The Supreme Court held that “serious psychological harm may constitute
serious bodily harm,”271 but the only guidance we have for what constitutes
serious psychological harm is that it must substantially interfere with
a person’s “health or well-being,” and it may be more “pervasive and
permanent…than…physical harm.”272 The term “bodily harm” is defined
in the Criminal Code to include a “hurt or injury” that “interferes with” the
person’s “health or comfort” in a way that is “more than merely transient
or trifling.”273 For example, “strong negative emotions” have been found
to indicate psychological harm.274 Courts have also interpreted the terms
“serious harm”275 and “grave risk…[of] psychological harm”276 in child
abduction cases. Where a parent argues a child cannot be returned because
they are at risk of psychological harm, under the Hague Convention, the
risk of psychological harm must be “substantial” and “not trivial,”277 and
under the Ontario Children’s Law Reform Act, which implements the
Hague Convention in Ontario, a court must determine the “likelihood and
severity” of the future harm.278 These lines of jurisprudence do not provide
a clear answer as to what might indicate serious psychological harm absent
an expert report, except to suggest the harm must be more than transitory
or trifling, and it must be substantial and not trivial.
The case the Court relied on in Smith v Jones involved a threat to rape.279
The psychological harm caused by the threat “substantially” interfered with

270. See Bishop & Bettinson, Evidence, supra note 15 at 12-13. See generally Nugent, supra note
138.
271. Smith, supra note 4 at para 83.
272. Smith, ibid at para 83, citing R v McCraw, [1991] 3 SCR 72, 1991 CanLII 29 at 81.
273. CCC, supra note 126 at 2.
274. R v F(T), 2008 NWTTC 11 at paras 8-24. See also R v Arcand, 2010 ABCA 363 at para 168; R
v B(D), 2016 ABPC 23 at paras 33-34, 45-47; R v S(WL), [2014] 1102 APR 180, 115 WCB (2d) 455
(NL PC) at paras 73-76.
275. Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c C12, s 23.
276. Convention of the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 25 October 1980, CTS
1983/35; 19 ILM 501, art 13(b) (entered into force 1 December 1983).
277. Ojeikere v Ojeikere, 2018 ONCA 372 at para 55 [Ojeikere]; Thomson v Thomson, [1994] 3 SCR
551, 119 DLR (4th) 253; [Thomson]; Husid v Daviau, 2012 ONSC 547; Pollastro v Pollastro, [1999]
OJ No 911 (ON CA), 1999 CanLII 19933.
278. Ojeikere, ibid at paras 51-58 and 62; Thomson, ibid.
279. See Smith, supra note 4 at para 83.
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the “health or well-being” of the intended victim.280 Therefore, any threat
that substantially interferes with the health or well-being of a survivor may
meet the test. For example, a threat to harm the survivor’s children or have
them taken away, to harm the survivor’s friends or family, to withhold the
necessities of life, to have her committed, or to kill her, any of these threats
may substantially interfere with her health or well-being. If a survivor is
already suffering from coercive control and a threat is made to harm her
or her loved ones, it could cause serious psychological harm analogous
to a threat of rape provided the threat interfered with her health or wellbeing.281 Put another way, provided a pattern of tactics exists, meaning
the victim is already suffering, then any threat would likely increase the
severity of her distress and thus meet the seriousness prong of the test.
Finally, financial control is a common tactic post-separation.282 In
British Columbia, the Provincial Court has recognized that refusal to pay
support can be “designed to inflict psychological and emotional harm,”
and it may contribute to a finding of family violence under the BC FLA.283
The threat to cause financial harm is an exception to confidentiality in New
Brunswick, where there is risk of substantial financial injury caused by an
unlawful act.284 That rule has not been duplicated by any other Canadian
law society. Financial control, or threats to inflict financial devastation can
be traumatic to vulnerable women (and their children) who are already
suffering financially because of the end of the relationship.285 In my view,
given that financial control robs the survivor of her independence and
ability to provide for herself and her children, the threat to financially harm
her would meet the seriousness prong of the test.286 The Department of
Justice has said that coercive control is the “most serious type of violence
280. McCraw, supra note 77 at 88.
281. Cf Dodek, SCP, supra note 34 at 263 (since the threat to rape constituted a threat of serious
bodily harm, “a threat of kidnapping or torture would qualify as ‘serious psychological harm’ even in
the absence of physical harm”).
Cf Tanovich, supra note 5 at 299 (emotional and psychological child abuse would qualify as
psychological harm).
282. See i.e. Thomas, supra note 207.
283. P(JC) v B(J), 2013 BCPC 297 at para 15. See also BC FLA, supra note 22 at ss 37-38; Boyd &
Lindy, supra note 208 at 105; Hokhold, supra note 235.
284. See LSNB, supra note 5 at R 3.3-3B.
285. See Mary Jane Mossman et al., Families and the Law: Cases and Commentary, 2nd ed (Concord,
ON: Captus Press, 2015) at 894; Moge v Moge, [1992] 3 SCR 813, 99 DLR (4th) 456 at 853-857.
286. Financial harm could mean refusing to pay child or spousal support, threatening to hide assets,
threatening to call social services when they are providing financial assistance, threatening reputational
harm that would impact income, and so on. Cf Dodek, SCP, supra note 34 at 263 (a threat to a home, a
threat similar to that posed by Bernie Madoff, or a threat to defraud a senior of her life savings, should
qualify).
Cf Tanovich, supra note 5 at 300 (significant economic loss suffered by a vulnerable victim
qualifies).
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in family law.”287 Provided there is coercive control, any ongoing abuse,
or the threat of any abuse, should meet the seriousness prong of the test.
3. Imminence
The Court held that “imminence” does not mean immediate. A threat can
be imminent even if it does not manifest for a period of time as long as it
“creates a sense of urgency.”288 The purpose of the exception is not about
addressing a past harm, it is about addressing a future harm. As a result,
where there is coercive control, the question should be whether the pattern
of abuse has ceased. If it has, if there is no future threat, the exception does
not apply.
Where there is ongoing coercive control, it would be illogical to
suggest that because the abuse is not getting worse—it is only maintaining
its terribleness—that the imminence prong is not met. Although the test
was conceived for a new threat, it does not omit an ongoing harm provided
there is a sense of urgency.289 As such, where tactics are currently causing
serious psychological harm, in my view, the imminence prong is satisfied.
This idea also applies where a pattern exists, and a new tactic is introduced;
indeed, urgency may become clearer after separation given the increased
risk that occurs once the parties separate.
Despite the seriousness of coercive control, violating the lawyerclient relationship by betraying a client’s loyalty and disclosing protected
information contrary to his interests should only be done when there is no
other option to prevent harm.290 A lawyer’s role is not to morally evaluate
her client’s conduct, but rather to facilitate his ability to make decisions
about how to live relative to what the law allows. A lawyer’s role is to
provide access to the law and to pursue her client’s interests within the
bounds of legality.291 Canadian law has not prohibited coercive control292
(despite the obvious need), and even the most heinous individual deserves
competent representation and access to the law. In short, the purpose of
disclosure must not be to punish the privilege-holder. A lawyer cannot
elect to disclose because her client’s behaviour is morally objectionable

287. Legislative Background, supra note 26 at B.
288. Smith, supra note 4 at para 84.
289. Cf Dodek, SCP, supra note 34 at 264 (where there is a “history of child abuse and a strong
likelihood of future child abuse, the imminence factor would be met”).
290. See Model Code, supra note 4 at Rs 3.3-3[1] and [3].
291. See Wendel, Fidelity, supra note 16 at 49-52 and 176; Woolley, Positivist, supra note 16 at 88.
292. See generally Private Members Bill C-247, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (controlling or
coercive conduct), 2nd Sess, 43rd Parl, 2020 (first reading 05 October 2020).
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and she wants to sever the relationship. The threat to the victim must
outweigh the need to preserve the solicitor-client relationship.293
In sum, the seriousness and imminence prongs of the test are the easiest
two prongs to meet. The challenge for an abuser’s lawyer is whether she
will see enough of the pattern to meet the third prong. In other words, the
test will only be helpful in the clearest of cases. As a result, the exception
is unhelpful in most cases, where a lawyer only has her client’s side of the
story and an uncomfortable hunch.
IV. Where does that leave us?
An abuser’s lawyer may want to disclose information to the judge to ensure
they make a fully informed decision about the abuse.294 She may want to
influence a parenting schedule that includes overnights or unsupervised
access because she is concerned. She may want to warn opposing counsel
that her client’s behaviour is getting worrisome, so they can manage the
case together safely. However, a lawyer’s role properly viewed does not
allow her to do any of these things absent her client’s consent. She cannot
influence an outcome in a way that she perceives is better than what her
client wants, and the law allows. She cannot violate his confidence to
try to steer him towards what she perceives is just or moral. Even where
adversarial proceedings “will likely affect the health, welfare or security
of a child” the Model Code only allows a lawyer to “advise” her client to
“take into account the best interests of the child.”295 The Code does not
prioritize the child’s well-being over that of the client. The lawyer could
withdraw if there is a “serious loss of confidence” between the two,296 but
that will not help the survivor. Where the future harm exception is not met,
a lawyer must maintain her client’s confidences and pursue his interests as
he has identified them, within what the law allows. A lawyer can morally
counsel her client the same way anyone can, but she must be certain that
he can tell the difference between her moral advice and her legal advice,297
and she must allow him to be the moral decision-maker over his life—
even when he makes a foolish and even harmful decision. A lawyer is her
293. See Smith, supra note 4 at para 85.
294. This argument is taken from my earlier Slaw column, see Deanne Sowter, “Coercive
Control: What Should a Good Lawyer Do?” (27 December 2019), online (blog): Slaw <www.slaw.
ca/2019/12/27/coercive-control-what-should-a-good-lawyer-do/> [perma.cc/5SZA-JRQ8] [Sowter,
Coercive Control].
295. See Model Code, supra note 4 at R 5.1-1[4]. See also Law Society of British Columbia,
“Common-sense guidelines for family law lawyers” (May 2013) at 7 and 8, online: Law Society of
British Columbia <www.lawsociety.bc.ca> [perma.cc/5SZA-JRQ8].
296. Model Code, ibid at R 3.7-2.
297. See Wendel, Fidelity, supra note 16 at 137-143; Bradley Wendel, “The Limits of Positivist Legal
Ethics: A Brief History, a Critique, and a Return to Foundations” (2017) 30 Can JL & Jur 443 at 450.
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client’s agent,298 her role is to provide access to our system of laws—for
someone else. To do that well, she must be neutral about the moral merits
of his lawful objectives.
The very obvious problem is just how harmful ignoring a hunch and
facilitating the client’s interests can be when there is coercive control. The
future harm exception can be helpful in some instances when warning the
survivor might be helpful; but there is no agency that a lawyer can call to
intervene the way there is with children, and since the behaviour is not
criminal the criminal justice system will likely not be helpful either. The
exception does not alter the lawyer’s role, it was not designed with coercive
control or even family violence in mind, and there is no other exception
that fits that purpose. As Alice Woolley has argued, where the law allows
or requires objectionable conduct, we shouldn’t look to blame the lawyer
but rather to change the law that allows or requires the behaviour.299 As
such, a comprehensive response to the problem I have presented here
would involve a national family violence strategy300 that recognizes
and criminalizes coercive control, and that changes the lawyer’s role in
resolving disputes involving coercive control. Absent such an overhaul,
within the existing legal framework, I suggest the following amendments
to the Model Code:
1.
Definitions—Rule 1.1: “coercive control” means an ongoing
pattern of domination by which abusive partners primarily
interweave repeated tactics which may include physical and
sexual violence, intimidation, sexual degradation, isolation and
control.
Commentary
[1] Two distinguishing features of coercive control are the
pattern of tactics, and the motivation to create a willing victim.
Tactics will likely include a pattern of coercion tactics coupled
with a pattern of control tactics, used over a prolonged period of
time;
[2] Coercion tactics may include but are not limited to physical
violence (including sexual abuse), intimidation, threats
(including to animals or property), gaslighting, surveillance
(including stalking), and degradation;
298. See Wendel, Fidelity, ibid at 49-54.
299. See Woolley, Positivist, supra note 16 at 81.
300. See also Yves Faguy, “Q&A with Jennifer Koshan: The University of Calgary law professor on
Canada’s patchwork of laws addressing domestic violence” (20 April 2020), online: CBA National
Magazine <www.nationalmagazine.ca> [perma.cc/4N8D-L9PN].
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[3] Control tactics may include but are not limited to isolation,
financial control, and micromanagement;301
[4] What is commonly known as litigation harassment, legal
bullying, systems abuse, or paper abuse, may also be a tactic of
coercive control;
[5] The harm caused by coercive control can also extend to a
victim’s child who may be a secondary victim.302
2.

Advocacy—Rule 5.1-1—Commentary303
[1.1]: In Adversarial and Non-Adversarial Proceedings: A
lawyer should be on guard against becoming the tool or dupe
of an abusive client’s scheme to continue a pattern of coercive
control. Vigilance is required because the means of these tactics
may include abusing the justice system, such as by: refusing to
file court documents, filing late, filing incomplete statements,
bringing vexatious claims, disobeying court orders, delaying,
changing lawyers, refusing to negotiate, making threats,
bringing applications to review or vary, appealing, refusing to
disclose or withholding assets, and refusing to pay support.

3.

Advocacy—Rule 5.1-2. When acting as an advocate, a lawyer
must not:304
(a.1): knowingly assist or permit a client to abuse the process
of the tribunal by instituting or continuing proceedings that,
although legal in themselves, are clearly brought for the purpose
of continuing a pattern of coercive control;
(a.2): knowingly assist or permit a client to intentionally use
tactics that, although legal in themselves, are designed to
continue a pattern of coercive control during any form of
negotiations including mediation and collaborative practice;305

301. This description is drawn from a combination of Stark’s work and the Bill C-78 amendments,
and is intentionally broad in order to capture psychological harm without unnecessarily confining the
description thereby excluding competing typologies.
302. See Stark & Hester, supra note 9 at 96.
303. See Model Code, supra note 4 at R 5.1-1 (deals with the lawyer’s role as an advocate in an
adversarial proceeding).
304. See Model Code, ibid at R 5.1-2 (deals with the type of conduct that is prohibited when a lawyer
is acting as an advocate in an adversarial proceeding before a tribunal).
305. See generally Wanda Wiegers, Jennifer Koshan & Janet Mosher, “Domestic Violence and
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Family Law Disputes” (15 November 2018), online (blog): Ablawg
<www.ablawg.ca> [perma.cc/TLW5-FDC9]; Deanne Sowter, “Full Disclosure: Family Violence and
Legal Ethics” (2020) 53:1 UBC L Rev 139; Sowter, Coercive Control, supra note 294.
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Future Harm / Public Safety Exception—Rule 3.3-3—
Commentary306
[2.1] Coercive control that is either ongoing or increasing in
severity can indicate serious psychological harm for the purpose
of the exception.307

Including coercive control in the Model Code would raise lawyers’
awareness of this type of abuse. Even though there are better methods
for responding to coercive control, such as criminalization and family
law reform, it is vital that a systemic response includes the law governing
lawyers. By including coercive control in the Model Code, it tells all
lawyers that coercive control is serious enough to warrant exceptional
treatment and a collective response. Family violence changes the rules for
lawyers, and it is time for the regulation of the profession to reflect that.
Conclusion
Coercive control requires “the strongest legal interventions, both family
and criminal.”308 The system we have is not responsive enough to family
violence generally, and coercive control specifically. Coercive control
creates a challenge for lawyers and judges who need to be able to see the
connection between “seemingly unrelated events,”309 and respond safely.
The pervasiveness of abuse and the seriousness of the harm indicate we
need a systemic shift in how family law disputes are resolved, and the
lawyer’s role within that system. We need a justice system and professional
rules that acknowledge, identify, and respond to coercive control.

306. See Model Code, supra note 4 at R 3.3-3.
307. Since this is merely guidance it should not create a disconnect between the test as it is applied to
solicitor-client privilege.
308. Luke’s Place Report, supra note 1 at 9.
309. Bettinson & Bishop, Offence, supra note 138 at 182.
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